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 While a growing literature in collaborative public management has made progress 
in our understanding of stakeholder collaboration, it has generally evaluated such efforts 
on criteria such as inclusiveness and the emergence of consensus. However, this 
theoretical framework, while not necessarily incorrect, has left us wanting for detailed 
explanations of individual and group decision-making processes, negotiation strategies, 
and the differential influence of competing interest groups within collaborative 
negotiations. How do individuals or groups involved in collaborative governance make 
decisions when their preferences and values are opposed? How do they reach a unified 
outcome that all can accept? Who compromises, on what, how much, and why? What 
role does the technical complexity of the problem play in this decision calculus? These 
are the key motivating questions behind this dissertation.  
 I provide answers to these theoretical questions first by proposing a decision-
making theory that draws from procrastination, obedience, and rational addiction 
theories in behavioral economics literature. I then show how this theory can be applied 
to explain why sometimes interest groups involved in long-term negotiations, such as 
those in collaborative governance arrangements, sometimes make decisions and agree to 
solutions that, on the surface, seem inconsistent with their preferences. I argue that one 
of the key elements driving this type of behavior is the technical complexity so 
frequently involved in these cases. 
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 The dissertation then examines this theory empirically through studies of two 
recent cases of collaborative governance drawn from Habitat Conservation Plans under 
the Endangered Species Act: the Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan and the 
Charlotte County (Florida) Scrub-Jay Habitat Conservation Plan. The case selection is 
designed to give maximum variation in technical complexity between the two cases. I 
employ archival research and in-depth interviews with individuals involved in the 
negotiation processes over these two cases in order to understand the most important 
factors affecting individual and group decisions throughout the process. The results are 
consistent with the predictions drawn from the theory. In the higher complexity case, the 
interaction of technical and political complexity has resulted in perpetual delay and thus 
the least effective alternative for preserving the species. In the comparison case, 
however, negotiations resulted in the most robust conservation alternative that was 
practicable under the circumstances. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past 25 years there has been a collaborative revolution in public policy 
and public administration. In many policy areas, though particularly in environmental 
and natural resources management, buzzwords like cooperative policymaking and 
collaborative management have become synonymous with efforts to replace old top-
down, command and control regulatory regimes with new ones that emphasize 
cooperation, compromise, and consensus (Ansell and Gash 2008). These new methods 
of solving collective action problems deemphasize the traditional adversarial 
relationships between regulators and regulated interests, as well as between industry and 
public interest groups (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). These practices range from local 
watershed collaboratives (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005), to large-scale efforts at conserving 
imperiled wildlife (Layzer 2008), and even cooperation between agencies and regulated 
industries at the highest levels of government (Coglianese 1997). They have generated a 
large and growing body of literature that explains why these groups and governments 
choose to collaborate, and even what conditions favor the formation of consensus.  
However, much less scholarly focus has been placed on explaining outcomes in 
cases of collaborative governance. Many of these scholars, intentionally or not, seem to 
assume that a successful collaboration is one that produces consensus. However, this 
does little good if we want to predict substantive outcomes. What type of consensus will 
be produced? Which parties to the collaborative negotiations will give more and which 
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ones will take more? These are the important questions if we want to build predictive 
theories of collaborative governance that will explain substantive outcomes, rather than 
just the occurrence of collaboration.  
The contribution of this dissertation is to offer a theory that can help to bridge the 
divide between explaining when and under what circumstances collaboration occurs, to 
explaining when and under what circumstances particular outcomes emerge from 
collaboration. To do this, I argue, we must understand how actors are making decisions 
about conflict, compromise, and alternative courses of action within collaborative 
decision-making bodies. It is important to understand how the circumstances of the 
collaboration, such as evaluation of alternatives, costs, and payoffs over time affect 
decision-making.  
Economic theories that explain how people’s preferences can vary over time and 
how payoffs can be discounted differently over time can be usefully adapted to gain 
insight into how people in collaborative governance, where decisions are made 
incrementally over long periods of time, evaluate their alternatives. These are the same 
theories that explain various behaviors that appear to be irrational, such as addiction and 
procrastination. I draw from these theories to incorporate them into a new framework of 
decision making in collaborative governance. The framework incorporates the effects of 
the technical complexity and uncertainty over the issue that is being negotiated on the 
presence of these time-inconsistent behaviors in members’ decision making. I then 
evaluate the theory by using a similar systems case study design, comparing two cases of 
collaborative habitat conservation plans in the state of Florida. 
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Theory 
The chief goal of this theory is to explain why one group in a negotiation over a 
collaborative governance undertaking, might in some circumstances be induced to accept 
an outcome that is far removed from the group’s ideal point. Why, for example, might an 
environmental interest group participate in a collaboration that produces an outcome that 
is far less protective than the group would otherwise be willing to accept?  
One way to answer this question is to explain how a group can be taken far off 
course through a series of marginal moves over a long period of time. One key point to 
keep in mind is that frequently the length of negotiations over a collaborative 
undertaking is measured in years, and decisions are not made all at once, they are made, 
revised, and remade over dozens or even hundreds of iterations over that time. Economic 
theories of time-inconsistent preferences provide an interesting way to gain insight into 
this phenomenon. For decades economists have been investigating phenomena, such as 
addiction, overspending, and procrastination, that seem to defy rational choice 
assumptions (e.g., Akerlof 1991, Becker and Murphy 1988, O’Donoghue and Rabin 
1999, Strotz 1956). At the core of the problem lie a human propensity for present-biased 
preferences, or a preference for immediate rewards, even if they come at greater long-
term costs. When an individual makes one decision that is at odds with his or her long-
term best interests, its effect might be so small as barely to be noticeable. However, 
where this causes problems for people is when they make the same decision over and 
over again to the point where these marginal impacts compound into one large one.  
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The argument I present here is that individuals participating in collaborative 
governance negotiations, because they take place over long periods of time and decisions 
are made in marginal increments, can under the right circumstances succumb to these 
same present-biased preferences that lead them off course from what they might have 
hoped to accomplish at the outset. However, predicting when and under what 
circumstances this will happen requires some additional theorizing. I argue that this 
present-biased behavior is more likely to occur when the complexity of the task, or the 
subject matter that is being negotiated, is particularly high. The reason for this is that the 
uncertainty generated by a higher complexity scenario can make decision making more 
difficult by making alternatives more difficult to evaluate effectively. A savvy interest 
group can capitalize on this confusion to bring the negotiations closer to its own 
preferences. At each stage of negotiations one group is faced with accepting a marginal 
loss or leaving the process, thus invoking some outcome potentially of even greater 
uncertainty. Where uncertainty is high, judgments about what is the best course of action 
will be more difficult to make, so these groups will ultimately hesitate to make the big, 
irreversible decision of leaving.  
A helpful way to think about this might be to think of the analogy of a pilot on a 
cross-country flight, making course corrections in bad weather. The weather presents 
some uncertainty as to the appropriate heading at which the pilot should point the plane. 
Each minor course correction might carry the aircraft farther off course, to the point 
where in the end a major course correction is necessary. To bring this back to the realm 
of negotiating over collaborative governance, we might think of a hypothetical of two 
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groups with competing interests negotiating over some policy. If there is sufficient 
uncertainty over the outcome of any particular course of action, and there is sufficient 
uncertainty about what outcome would be induced in the event that a group decides to 
defect, It might seem like the perfectly rational thing to do is to accept a small defeat in 
the current round of negotiations rather than invoking an uncertain, and potentially 
worse outcome. 
Of course, there are similarities between the theory offered here and other public 
policy theories, perhaps most notably the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) 
originally created by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). While the theory that I 
articulate here is not intended to be an add-on to ACF theory, it is also not intended to be 
a competitor, and the possibility remains that with some adjustments this theory could 
function under the umbrella of ACF theory. There are, however, some key differences 
that are worth noting. Probably the most important difference is the distinction between 
the purposes of the two projects. ACF theory is a model of policy change over long 
periods of time, focusing on large policy subsystems that include all those with expertise 
and/or interests in a given policy area. The focus of my theory is to explain the specific 
outcomes of individual negotiations that may or may not take place within one of these 
larger policy subsystems. While ACF theory also includes some treatment of negotiated 
agreements within policy subsystems, they are handled very differently from the way I 
theorize about them here. Most importantly, ACF theory borrows heavily from 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) literature, which, in addition to ignoring various 
rational choice assumptions to which I adhere, focuses largely on reducing conflict and 
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producing consensus as a goal in itself (Sabatier and Weible 2007). Instead of focusing 
on explaining the conditions that produce consensus and avoid stalemate, I focus here on 
building a framework that can explain substantively what the consensus that emerges 
from a negotiation is likely to look like.  
Research Design 
I evaluate the theory by analyzing two selected cases of habitat conservation 
plans in Florida. I selected these cases to achieve maximum variation on the key 
independent variable of technical complexity while holding constant as many potentially 
confounding factors as possible. The case with the high technical complexity and 
uncertainty is the Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan (FBHCP). This is the 
largest scale and most technically complex HCP that has ever been attempted. It includes 
25 coastal counties in Florida and 19 different imperiled species, including sea turtles, 
beach mice, and shorebirds. The simpler case, with much less technical complexity and 
uncertainty is the Charlotte County Scrub-Jay HCP, which provides minimization and 
mitigation for impacts to the Florida Scrub-Jay throughout the county from habitat loss 
due to residential and commercial development.  
I compare the outcomes of the two cases. The theory predicts that, due to the 
much less complicated task of preserving the Florida Scrub-Jay in Charlotte County, this 
case should produce a stronger outcome in which environmental interests have to yield 
less territory to development interests than will be the case in the FBHCP. In the FBHCP 
case, on the other hand, a high amount of scientific uncertainty, particularly with regard 
to the shorebird species included in the plan, creates a very different scenario in which 
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those with an interest in a less protective, smaller plan have induced the environmental 
groups to make some compromises by making arguments about the uncertainty involved 
in estimating shorebird populations and determining the best scenarios for their survival. 
With a few caveats that will be discussed both in the case studies and in the concluding 
chapter, the cases are largely consistent with the theory. 
Plan for the Dissertation 
The next chapter begins with a detailed review of existing literature on 
collaborative governance. It then delves into greater detail on the theory that I introduced 
above, including an in-depth discussion of the economics literature on time-inconsistent 
preferences from which it is partially adapted. Chapter 3 introduces the subject matter 
for the empirical component of the study, beginning with some background on habitat 
conservation plans and their origins. Chapter 3 then goes on to introduce some basic 
background on the two cases, including why each one was selected for the study. I close 
Chapter 3 by discussing the interview and archival research methods employed to 
analyze the cases. Chapter 4 presents the case study of the FBHCP, including the story 
of its origins, a detailed account of the negotiation process, and an assessment of its 
outcomes. This chapter also presents some conclusions from the case concerning how it 
conforms, with a couple of caveats, with what was predicted. Chapter 5 presents the case 
study of the Charlotte County HCP in a similar format. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the 
study by drawing some direct comparisons between the cases, discussing the ways in 
which the results of the case studies fit the theory, as well as ways in which they suggest 
some possible modifications for the theory. Chapter 6 also includes a reflection upon the 
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broader implications of the findings for the theory and practice of collaborative 
governance. The chapter closes with some reflections on the limitations of this study and 
some future directions for improving and expanding this work. 
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CHAPTER II  
SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO NOW? BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 
IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 
 
Management of the environment and natural resources in the United States has 
been traditionally adversarial, frequently characterized by conflict between 
polluter/extractor interests and environmental interest groups, and disputes between both 
types of groups and government agencies. Historically, environmental policy was also 
characterized by a top-down federal regulatory regime (Layzer 2008). However, over the 
past few decades this has begun to change, perhaps beginning with the push for 
informal, cooperative approaches to environmental enforcement in the early 1980s 
(Bardach and Kagan 1982). Experts and participants on all sides of the issues have 
become frustrated with the shortcomings of the contentious adversarial system, and have 
sought to usher in a new era in environmental and natural resource management defined 
by a more cooperative relationship between the interested parties.  
This move toward collaborative solutions to contentious problems has generated 
a rich literature in public administration and policy, which has shed light on some 
aspects of the internal mechanics of such groups, important questions remain 
unanswered, or the answers remain incomplete. How do individuals or groups involved 
in collaborative governance make decisions when their preferences and values are 
opposed? How do they reach a unified outcome that all can accept? What determines 
who will compromise, on what, how much, and why? These are the key motivating 
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questions behind this project. I will argue that the answers to these questions are 
conditional upon a range of political factors both internal and external to a collaborative 
governance effort. I bring together theories from political science, public management, 
behavioral economics, and psychology to develop a theory of decision making in a large 
collaborative governance effort.  
The Collaborative Revolution 
Collaborative governance includes a broad spectrum of networked governance 
and management concepts that are closely related. These various concepts all focus on 
collections of interested groups and individuals, as well as governing entities that have a 
stake in the policy area, joining together to address a problem in a deliberative, 
cooperative way, in which no one member or group has coercive authority over another. 
The lack of coercive authority, of course, may contradict the requirement that relevant 
governing entities, which by definition have coercive authority, be involved. This type of 
networked governance strategy has proliferated as a possible solution to complex, 
intractable problems on which consensus is difficult or impossible to achieve (see, for 
example, Rittel and Webber 1973 on “wicked problems”).  
I use the term collaborative governance as an umbrella term because the field 
seems to lack a unified language on this topic. Among the nearly interchangeable terms 
in this category are stakeholder partnerships (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002), 
collaborative public management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, Lubell 2004), 
collaborative policymaking (Leach and Sabatier 2005), ecosystem-based management 
(Layzer 2008), and coregulation (Steelman 2010). These collaborative undertakings are 
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as diverse as the multitude of scholarly terms for them suggests. They can range in size 
from small local watershed-scale partnerships to massive multi-state compacts. They 
also range in formality from informal agreements between private stakeholders to formal 
agreements that carry the force of a legally binding contract.  
The diversity in types of collaboration might be one barrier to unifying 
collaborative governance theory. Though there are certainly similarities, there are also 
reasons to believe, for example, that incentives, decision-making processes, and 
negotiation strategies might differ when a collaborative process is informal and 
nonbinding, versus when it is formal, binding, and enforced by a governmental 
authority. I focus here on formal collaborative structures that are formed with the 
intention of reaching a binding, enforced solution to a specific problem. To that end, I 
borrow the working definition of collaborative governance proposed by Ansell and Gash 
(2008, 544), in which collaborative governance is “a governing arrangement where one 
or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-
making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to 
make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” 
Collaborative governance, along with a spate of very closely related cooperation-
based, local flexibility-driven management concepts, has been popularized in scholarship 
and in practical application in recent years in response to the difficulties of implementing 
some of the landmark environmental legislation of the 1970s. It is a tool that came forth 
out of a series of policy innovations intended to deal more effectively, and more 
democratically, with the difficulties of environmental and natural resources management 
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(Steelman 2010). Environmentalists complained that the centralized, inflexible classical 
regulatory approach of these laws was a poor match for problems that ignore political 
boundaries and thus require context-based, localized, flexible responses. Simultaneously, 
industry groups balked at rigid, top-down regulation implemented by technocrats 
(Layzer 2008). If environmentalist and regulated industry groups could agree on one 
thing it was that the old approach to environmental regulation was untenable from both 
perspectives, and a new system that incorporated local flexibility and cooperation into 
the regulatory process was necessary. It is also worth noting, however, that collaboration 
became popular amid the early 1980s conservative backlash and the Reagan era of 
American conservatism. As Layzer (2012) points out, American conservatives define 
themselves in opposition to the government intervention in markets that characterizes 
New Deal liberalism, preferring instead to align themselves with neoliberal principles 
that emphasize market based solutions to public problems. 
At the same time, political economists began to challenge 300-year-old 
Hobbesian assumptions that managing common pool resources is an inexorable 
prisoner’s dilemma that can only be ameliorated by strong, coercive government 
authority (e.g., Hardin 1968, Ophuls 1977). Most prominently, Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
showed that if we relax some of the debatable assumptions that Hardin and others make, 
it is actually possible for stakeholders in a common pool resource to come together and 
work out self-enforced, consensual schema for sustainable use, at least on a small, local 
scale. 
  13 
One of the key points of contention among environmentalists with the classical 
regulatory model is that its basis in geographically arbitrary political boundaries renders 
the approach fragmentary, ineffective, and in some cases even counterproductive 
(Layzer 2008). A new regulatory approach focused at the landscape scale was needed. 
Consequently, much of the scholarly literature on collaborative governance to date has 
focused on efforts to maintain or restore water quality to distressed local and regional 
watersheds throughout the U.S. (e.g., Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Leach, Pelkey, and 
Sabatier 2002; Lubell 2004; Sabatier et al. 2005), or to manage other common pool 
natural resources, such as irrigation water (Ostrom et al. 1999) and endangered species 
(Layzer 2008). 
Though previous scholarly work on managing natural resources through 
collaborative governance structures is varied, much of it has focused on identifying the 
conditions that produce collaboration. Less emphasis has been placed in the literature on 
what produces a successful collaboration. Even less scholarly work has focused on 
answering the question of whether, and under what circumstances, collaboration 
produces ecologically preferable outcomes as opposed to its alternatives. One reason for 
this is that determining how to measure and operationalize that concept is a difficult task. 
In fact, just how success should be defined is itself a point of contention within the 
literature. For many, success lies at least in part in the completion of a process that is 
legitimate on specific criteria, such as inclusiveness, usually derived from deliberative 
democratic theory (Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen 1999, Vanderheiden 2001), and the 
achievement of at least rough consensus among stakeholders as a good in itself.  
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Where collaborative theory is influenced by more general democratic theory, 
however, it places an emphasis on the outcomes of collaboration, and is critical of an 
approach that focuses on consensus as a goal in itself. Thus others argue that success 
should be defined by the empirical effects of the collaborative action on the system it is 
tasked with managing (e.g., Koontz and Thomas 2006, Thomas and Koontz 2011). 
However, due to the nature of many collaborative governance entities, data for 
evaluating them on these criteria are frequently unavailable, leaving scholars to evaluate 
them using perceptual measures collected from participant surveys (e.g., Leach, Pelkey, 
and Sabatier 2002; Lubell 2004; Sabatier et al. 2006; and others), which are problematic 
because of potential “halo” effects and the selection bias induced by selecting only those 
who were invited and chose to participate. 
Though we lack a unified framework for evaluating the merits of collaboration, 
progress has been made in determining the causes that make collaboration most likely. 
One of the most important of these seems to be the presence of trust and familiarity 
between stakeholders. This thesis has especially been advanced by scholars from the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) perspective (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
Sabatier et al. (2006, 196), for example, pull together frameworks from both the ACF 
and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) literature to create their theoretical framework 
for collaborative watershed management, a central pillar of which is the importance of 
building trust as “a necessary condition for reaching agreement.” As promoters of the 
virtues of social capital frequently argue, one of its key benefits is the building of trust 
(Putnam 2000). Other collaborative governance scholars include social capital in their 
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theoretical frameworks as a conduit for building and fostering trusting and productive 
relationships between stakeholders (e.g., Heikkila and Gerlak 2005, Lubell 2004). More 
recently, this group of scholars has made further strides in understanding the importance 
of trust, seeking to explain the determinants of trust in collaborative governance (Leach 
and Sabatier 2005, Lubell 2007). Leach and Sabatier (2005), for example, find that 
social psychology theory generates variables that reliably predict interpersonal trust 
among stakeholders in collaborative groups, such as norms of consensus, belief that 
procedures are fair, and belief that failure to cooperate would result in mutual stalemate.  
Other frequently cited components determining the relative success of 
collaborative action include leadership, incentives for good faith participation, decision 
rules, duration of the partnership, and commitment levels (Sabatier et al. 2006). Ansell 
and Gash (2007) echo the importance placed on all of these variables by Sabatier et al. 
and add an emphasis on the importance of starting conditions, such as power, 
knowledge, and resource asymmetries, and the history of cooperation or conflict 
between the members.  
Another important piece of the collaborative governance puzzle that has rightly 
received a great deal of attention is the role of scientific information in defining 
problems and evaluating alternatives (Gerlak and Heikkila 2005). In order to solve any 
policy problem one must first understand its cause. Similarly, in order to weigh 
alternatives for action one first needs to understand their effects. Scientific data thus 
constitute an integral part of any policy or management decision. The role of science 
features particularly prominently in studies of collaborative governance because, as 
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noted above, one of the problems with the classical regulatory approach leading to the 
proliferation of collaborative alternatives was that it lacked the flexibility to incorporate 
ecosystem-specific scientific data into the policymaking and management processes 
(Babbitt 2005, Layzer 2008). Almost every theoretical framework of the policy process, 
from Kingdon’s (2003) “multiple streams” theory to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s 
(1993) ACF theory, relies on problem definition through gathering new information as 
one of the first steps toward policy change. Applying problem definition theories to 
collaborative watershed management, Gerlak and Heikkila (2005) show that scientific 
information spurs policy action through increasing concurrence on problem salience. In 
other words, stakeholder partners broadly agree on the importance of the problem at 
hand. Similarly, Schlager and Blomquist (2008, 94) note that, “well-defined problems 
with clear causal mechanisms are likely to present clearer courses of action and 
consequently lower decision-making costs.” Of course, most of the problems typically 
addressed by collaborative governance are, by definition, poorly defined and technically 
complex to varying degrees. Failed efforts to solve them by other means are often the 
reason for employing the collaborative approach. 
Though this literature has produced knowledge of the causes of collaborative 
governance in certain ways, it leaves us wanting when we try to explain the outputs and 
outcomes of collaboration. I argue that in order to improve that understanding, 
improvement is needed at the micro-level. The model is in need of updating to include 
the internal decision making processes within collaborative groups. Trust, inclusiveness, 
decision rules, and other factors tell part of the story by showing us that they can foster 
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cooperative environments that are conducive to consensus decision making. But how 
consensus is produced is an extremely important component to the model that is 
currently not well understood. When multiple players come to the table with divergent, 
sometimes diametrically opposed preferences, achieving consensus means that one or 
more parties must move from their initial preferences. Who moves, and how far? That is 
the central question here and it is important because the outputs and outcomes of any 
attempt at collaboration hinge upon it. However, we know little about the decision-
making processes that lead to the compromise that is inherent in the requirement for 
consensus. Previous work on mutual trust, for example, might explain when a consensus 
is likely to be reached. However, it does not explain which group or groups will 
compromise further from their ideal points than others. Gaining insight into these 
decision-making processes, and what internal and external factors affect them, can bring 
the field closer to being able to predict outputs and outcomes in collaborative 
governance. The key contribution is to predict when collaboration is likely to produce a 
successful policy outcome, rather than just predicting the occurrence of collaboration or 
the emergence of consensus, thus allowing distinction between those times in which 
collaboration might be the best method for solving a problem from those in which some 
other method might be more effective. 
Decision-Making and Hyperbolic Discounting 
I propose an addition to current models of collaborative governance to 
incorporate key factors influencing the negotiation and decision-making processes at the 
individual level. While the collaborative governance literature discussed above has 
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revealed important factors affecting the collaborative process, questions remain about 
how individuals within collaborative governance frameworks make decisions about 
compromise and conflict, such as when to yield, when to cede territory, when to stand 
firm, and when to push for more. Answering these questions provide two theoretical 
advancements in the study of collaborative governance. First, providing theoretically 
sound and empirically defensible answers to these questions is essential to the ability of 
the field to build predictive theories of collaborative governance. Without understanding 
why some individuals or groups choose to compromise while others stand firm or exit 
negotiations in favor of other tactics, modeling the outputs and outcomes of 
collaborative governance will remain unachievable. Second, answering these questions 
will shed light on the negotiation process and offer a richer view of the power 
asymmetries, and their determinants, which have been explored but not fully theorized in 
the existing literature. I offer here a theory of decision making in collaborative 
governance, focusing on the options in front of collaborative stakeholders at a given 
decision point in the process and what factors, both internal and external to the 
institution, might cause them to choose a particular course of action, even if it seems to 
take them on a path that leads away from their ideal points.  
To achieve this goal any theory must be thoroughly grounded in a micro-theory 
of behavior. We must consider the tradeoffs that individuals face at each decision point 
in a negotiation over a prospective collaboration. For answers to how individuals view 
these tradeoffs and make decisions I look to well-developed theories in behavioral 
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economics and psychology that have successfully reconciled the paradox of behavior 
that appears to be inconsistent with preferences. 
Actions that seem to be inconsistent with one’s preferences or best interest has 
puzzled scholars and confounded our ability to explain many phenomena of human 
behavior. For years economists have pointed out that certain self-destructive behaviors, 
such as substance abuse (Becker and Murphy 1988), overeating (Lowe 1982), and 
procrastination (Akerlof 1991), defy classical assumptions about rationality. These 
authors and others have reconciled these anomalies by incorporating time-inconsistent 
preferences into models of economic behavior. Of course, time bias in preferences is 
nothing new. The human propensity to prefer immediate reward to delayed gratification 
has been understood for centuries. When offered a choice between $500 today and $550 
six months from now, most people will choose to accept the smaller reward today. To 
account for this, exponential discounting to account for present-biased preferences has 
become a universal maxim in behavioral economics, in spite of the fact that even the 
creator of exponential discounting understood that it was a poor reflection of reality in 
many circumstances (Loewenstein 1992). However, behaviors frequently observed in the 
world present challenges to the typical discounted utility model (Frederick, Loewenstein, 
and O’Donoghue 2002).  
Scholars in both behavioral economics and psychology have taken interest in 
solving these anomalies. In economics, Strotz (1956) was the first to acknowledge that 
discounting functions might not be exponential, and that when people understand that 
their preferences might be inconsistent over time, they frequently utilize commitment 
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mechanisms to constrain their own behavior to protect their best interest from their 
future selves. Others have also discussed the phenomenon of self-imposed restraint of 
the future self (e.g., Elster 1979). O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) later elaborated upon 
this by showing that individuals with more sophisticated understandings of their time-
inconsistent preferences will be disproportionately negatively impacted when benefits 
are immediate and costs come in the future. 
The core element of these models is the empirical fact that frequently people’s 
preferences vary over time. This is different from a standard discounted utility (DU) 
function because, while the DU function assumes a constant discount rate, models that 
account for time-inconsistent preferences do not make this assumption. Thaler (1981) 
found evidence in experiments that discount rates can decrease over longer time 
horizons versus shorter ones. Seeking to find the point that would make subjects 
indifferent between receiving $15 today and some other amount of money one month, 
one year, and 10 years from today, the discount rates revealed by the median responses 
indicated a more than 300% decrease in discount rate between a one month time horizon 
and a 10 year time horizon. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002, 361) give a 
useful example to illustrate how time can alter, or even reverse, preferences for 
immediate reward. “[S]omeone may prefer $110 in 31 days over $100 in 30 days, but 
also prefer $100 now over $110 tomorrow.” Though in the economics literature these 
behaviors, or the absence of these behaviors, is frequently reduced to whether or not an 
individual is sophisticated (e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999), there is evidence from 
psychology that sophistication or naiveté have little or nothing to do with it, and that in 
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fact these are natural patterns in the way the human brain processes decisions about costs 
and benefits, pleasure and pain (Ainslie 1992). 
Akerlof (1991) presents an elegant formal argument that shows precisely how 
time-inconsistent discounting functions can lead to perverse outcomes. Building on 
models of rational addiction and other time-inconsistent behaviors, Akerlof argues that 
two things, over-salience of present costs and over-discounting of future benefits, can 
lead to the initiation and continuation of behaviors that may not be in one’s best interest. 
The end result of these behaviors looks outrageous and irrational, but they are actually 
the results of not one big decision, but rather several smaller decisions over a period of 
time. To illustrate this point, Akerlof cites the famous Milgram (1974) experiments. 
Milgram, inspired by examples of countless human rights atrocities throughout history, 
wanted to examine how ordinary people could be induced to do sadistic things by an 
authority. Akerlof explains the results of the Milgram experiments as a sort of path 
dependent obedience to authority. The key is that the subjects were asked to administer 
shocks to “patients,” increasing in voltage in very small increments. At each stage, the 
subjects must weigh the costs and benefits of the decision to follow the order to 
administer the next shock. The “cost” of administering the shock is a burden on the 
subject’s conscience. The “cost” of refusing is the distress of standing up to an authority 
figure, or appearing uncooperative in front of peers. For the subjects who chose 
obedience (the majority), the cost of the latter was determined to be greater than that of 
the former. Thus, just as in Becker and Murphy’s (1988) model of rational addiction, in 
which past consumption of a product and discounting the future benefits of not 
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consuming it lead to addiction, so in the Milgram experiments past obedience to 
authority and discounting the future benefits of stopping, predict continued obedience.  
The same decision-making process, Akerlof shows, applies to explaining why 
people procrastinate or engage in other behaviors that are not in their best interest over 
the long term. For example, say that I know I need to file my income taxes. I could do it 
today, but there are also much more enjoyable things I would like to do with my spare 
time today, such as, well just about anything. If I value my today’s leisure time more 
than tomorrow’s, I am likely to put off filing my taxes today, with good intentions to do 
them tomorrow. This, of course, becomes problematic when I make the same decision 
tomorrow under the same circumstances, and the next day and the day after, until 
suddenly it is April 15 and putting it off until tomorrow is no longer an option. Of course 
this end result looks irrational. I would be a lot happier if I had filed my taxes months 
ago. I would have my refund already and my free time today would be mine to do with 
as I please. However, each individual decision to delay was only a minor, individually 
insignificant, setback. 
The connection between the literature on time-inconsistent preferences and 
collaborative governance is in the iterative decision making process at the individual 
level that takes place as a collaboration unfolds and the various parties attempt to 
negotiate a solution that resolves their differences. The logic of the economic theories 
reviewed above can be applied to explaining how individuals and groups make decisions 
in collaborative governance scenarios. Furthermore, there are important factors in the 
collaborative governance process that influence how this behavior manifests itself in any 
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given collaboration. When individuals or groups make the initial decision to participate 
in collaborative action it is generally a given that they will have to make compromises 
and give up something in the interest of cooperation. However, exactly what, and how 
much, they will have to give can be a source of great uncertainty at the beginning of 
negotiations. While some of this uncertainty can be mitigated by previous experiences 
with the collaborative process and with the other actors involved, there will always be 
some degree of uncertainty.  
Time preference theories can be useful in helping to predict what decisions the 
actors will make and explain why, particularly in cases in which the end result appears to 
be inconsistent with one group’s preferences. Just what type of compromise is brokered 
and who gives up what to the process is determined in multiple rounds of negotiations 
over an extended period of time, usually several years, and plans come together 
incrementally, with marginal shifts in either direction at each stage. Thus each 
participant must decide first at the outset whether to participate or take some alternative 
course of action to effect his or her desired outcome, and then again at each cut point in 
the extended negotiation process. Much like the “rational addict,” whose previous 
consumption of a substance makes his or her continued consumption more likely 
(Becker and Murphy 1988), the player in an extended negotiation game potentially must 
be willing to part with a great deal of sunk costs to exit the process, and will only do so 
if it is clear that the benefit of exit is likely to exceed these costs. The argument does not 
rely on some participants being naïve, unsophisticated, or misunderstanding the benefit 
of cutting sunk costs and exiting the process if such a decision will probabilistically 
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produce a more favorable outcome. Rather, the argument focuses on the situational 
factors clouding the rational actor’s ability to weigh the expected value of both 
outcomes. In other words, while an individual might have a sophisticated understanding 
of her preferences, where technical complexity and uncertainty make it difficult to 
determine which decision is most likely to realize those preferences, opportunities are 
created for opposing parties to use this uncertainty to their advantage. Technical 
uncertainty about outcomes, which subsequently affects the discounting of costs and 
benefits, becomes central here because it determines the individuals’ assessments of the 
costs and benefits. It shapes individuals’ abilities to recognize their interests clearly and 
coherently. In the next subsection I will clarify and elaborate by walking through a 
simple formal model to illustrate the important points of the theory. 
A Rudimentary Game to Illustrate 
The game has three players: a government agency (A) and two interest groups (B 
and C) with opposing preferences. These players come together in a collaborative effort 
to address some policy problem. I will begin with some preliminaries and simplifying 
assumptions. First, it is important to note that the relative power of the players in this 
scenario is already unequally distributed. The agency has a formal veto, as it gets final 
approval over whatever plan emerges from the process. An agency veto invokes an 
outcome of unknown cost to the interest groups. It is important to note that this 
alternative is not the same as the status quo, around which there is very little uncertainty. 
There is an assumption that the collaboration is initiated by the agency, which has 
already declared the status quo unacceptable for some reason, or by agreement of all 
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parties that the status quo is untenable. Though the agency wields a formal veto, there 
are checks on the agency veto power. An unmeritorious veto can trigger high costs for 
the agency, such as lawsuits or punishment from political principals. Thus the agency is 
likely to use its veto power judiciously.  
It is important to note that the agency, much like the two interest group players, 
has a policy ideal point. This ideal point is not inconsequential, and it does not 
necessarily lie at some neutral midway point between the ideal points of parties B and C. 
Thus it would be inaccurate to treat the agency as some sort of unbiased mediator (see, 
for example, Nordinger 1981 on how government officials are often guided by their own 
policy preferences). This ideal point will likely contribute to setting the tone of the 
relationships between the agency and each of the other two players, and this is an 
important factor in assessing power asymmetries, and each player’s initial assessment of 
whether or not to come to the negotiating table. However, the agency’s discretion is 
bounded by some statutory mandate and by the ability of dissatisfied parties to seek 
recourse in other venues. The very real threat of legislative sanction or litigation on 
behalf of the dissatisfied party limits the agency’s discretion and induces it to prioritize 
consensus building. As one interviewee with experience in collaborative governance 
negotiations from the agency perspective remarked, a successful outcome is one with 
which nobody is happy because everybody had to give up something. Thus the 
satisfactory outcome for the agency in this game might be different from its ideal 
outcome.  
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The interested parties (B and C) do not have the same sort of formal veto that the 
agency has. The process can move forward if one group walks away. However, this 
results in an outcome to which all interested parties have not agreed. Because this would 
leave the agency vulnerable to political and legal challenges, it will not favor this 
outcome. In short, the agency’s commitment to consensus keeps the cost of exit 
relatively high for the other two players.  
The decisions are made along a one-dimensional policy space, hereafter denoted 
as p. In a natural resources context this might represent the allocation of water between 
two interested parties, the amount of space set aside as a preserve for endangered 
species, or the amount of money paid into some sort of mitigation fund for offsetting an 
environmental impact. Group B has an ideal point 𝑝"∗ , and Group C has ideal point 𝑝$∗ . 
Admittedly, this is an abstraction for the sake of parsimony. In reality the policy space 
and the actors’ preferences are frequently multi-dimensional. For example, 
environmental groups might value more than the simple maximization of raw acreage of 
preserve space; they also value the contiguity of the space and the overall quality of the 
habitat present on the land. Thus a group might have multiple ideal points representing 
different combinations of the multiple dimensions that it finds suitable. However, for the 
sake of keeping the model manageable at this stage I employ this simplifying 
assumption. Each player has an ideal point along p and it will seek to move the final 
policy as close to this ideal point as possible. Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical set of 
ideal points for the players across the total range of the policy space p, represented by 
the horizontal line. Each player’s willingness to negotiate is presumably bounded by 
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some zone of acceptability. A group can live with anything inside its zone of 
acceptability, but will not accept anything outside this zone. The dashed portion of the 
horizontal line marks the area where all three zones of acceptability overlap. This is the 





Figure 1. Relative preferences of each player within policy space p 
 
 
 If this were the end of the game, it would be quite straightforward, and not 
particularly interesting. We could conclude that the ultimate policy decision will be 
somewhere within the dashed area and we could use already existing models of power 
asymmetries, bargaining, and inter-group dynamics to approximate where along the 
dashed line our participants would land. However, the innovation here is in taking into 
account the extended timeline over which these types of negotiations typically take place 
and incorporating the contributions from behavioral economics to our understanding of 
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players’ zones of acceptability are static through time. Figure 2 illustrates the iterative 
nature of the process, showing how p can vary at each decision point. Each player 
evaluates its expected utility of the proposed policy at each time period and decides 
whether to accept the proposal and continue the collaboration or to end participation. 





Figure 2. Iterative decision-making process and prospective policy movement 
 
 
An initial move is made at period 𝑡 − 𝑖. This is an important move because it 
determines the starting point for the negotiation process, thus to some extent setting the 
agenda and framing interaction between the players in the initial and future iterations of 
the game. However, the game does not require an assumption that one player is the 
agenda setter. The prime mover might be the agency or some neutral third party, such as 
a panel of experts who make a policy recommendation that becomes the starting point 
for negotiations (𝑝()*).  
At each stage of the process a player may propose an amendment to p. One 
group, for example, might seek to move p closer to its own ideal point, and likely will do 
so if it calculates that such a move would not induce the other strategic player’s 
pTpt−1pt−2pt−3pt−i
  29 
defection or an agency veto. Each player now has to evaluate its two options in each 
time period t after an updated proposal has been offered. Each group may choose to 
defect or cooperate. The groups compare the expected utility of defection versus 
cooperation. Say, for example, this round of negotiations has favored Group C and 
moved p closer to its ideal point and further from that of Group B. Group B must now 
decide how to react to this marginal loss. If Group B decides to defect, its payoff will be: 𝑈(𝐵)( = −𝐷(1 + 𝛿) 
where D is the cost of defection. This cost might come in the form of putting itself at a 
structural disadvantage by not being able to continue to influence the process. It might 
also be the cost of pursuing legal action to assert its influence. The δ term represents all 
the factors that might inflate Group B’s assessment of the costs of immediate exit. This 
might be affected by scientific uncertainty that makes unclear what the ultimate outcome 
will be, or political uncertainty over what outcome the collaboration will produce in 
Group B’s absence. I will discuss this in greater detail in the next section. 
Group B’s other option is to accept the marginal loss, continue to play for now, 
and plan to defect when negotiations reach some threshold 𝑡∗, which is the point at 
which it has determined that even with its continued participation, 𝑝4 is likely to be 
outside its zone of acceptability. In this case, its utility function will be: 
𝑈(𝐵)( = −𝐷 − 𝐶 (𝑝( − 𝑝()6)(∗)6(  
where 𝑝( is the proposed policy offered at time t, 𝑝()6 is the policy that Group B already 
agreed to in the previous iteration, and C represents the costs of the marginal loss in each 
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round summed over all rounds up to and including the round immediately prior to 𝑡∗. 
We can see in the first equation that an increase in δ decreases the expected utility of 
immediate defection. Therefore, as long as δ is sufficiently high, Group B will be willing 
to accept a marginally decreasing utility in each iteration of the game. In other words, as 
long as the cost of exit is high and Group B still believes it might be able to influence the 
process in its favor with continued participation, it will be willing to continue to 
compromise away from its ideal point.  
It is important to note that δ is not necessarily static throughout the negotiations. 
It might increase and decrease over time, as new information becomes available and as 
political circumstances change. Returning to the diagram in Figure 1, then, an increase in 
Group B’s δ term might expand its zone of acceptability closer to Group C’s ideal point. 
A savvy Group C might recognize this and seize the opportunity to shrink the outer limit 
of its own zone of acceptability. I have illustrated this hypothetical scenario in Figure 3, 
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We can see here that under these circumstances the negotiation space has been 
shifted to the right, closer to Group C’s ideal point. Ultimately, the primary implication 
of the game is that whichever party has a lower value of δ will have the power to move 
policy incrementally closer to its own ideal point by inducing the other player to make 
concessions in the interest of continued cooperation. 
Factors Influencing Decisions in the Game 
In the model above, the decisions each player makes at each cut point are directly 
affected by the value of the δ term. This term represents the factors that exacerbate or 
make unclear the costs associated with leaving. This is predominantly a function of 
uncertainty that can come in multiple forms. Specifically, uncertainty can be technical or 
political. Complicating things even further is the fact that technical uncertainty can 
interact with political uncertainty. Often in collaborative governance arrangements there 
is a great deal of technical complexity. In fact, collaborative governance is frequently 
employed specifically to address stalemate over highly complicated issues in which 
stakeholders are at an impasse. However, there can still be variability between cases with 
regard to just how complex the problem is. With policy areas ranging from cooperative 
economic development to collaborative environmental management at the landscape 
scale, some problems contain more moving parts than others.  
I argue that the role of this technical complexity is important because it can affect 
political uncertainty. A policy problem characterized by a high amount of technical 
complexity frequently forces policymakers to deal with a correspondingly high amount 
of scientific and technical uncertainty about alternatives for solving it. Endangered 
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species present a good example of this. In addition to the usual philosophical 
disagreements over the utility of preventing extinctions, opponents of conservation 
frequently challenge the ability of science to discern human impact on species 
populations from natural cycles. The same phenomenon can be seen in the popular 
discourse over global warming. Though 97 percent of climate scientists have reached 
consensus that anthropogenic climate change is happening, opponents of environmental 
regulation frame the issue as though it were an open debate in which experts are split 
50/50. This strategy of questioning the accuracy of the science behind environmental 
regulation dates back at least as far as the anti-environmentalist backlash of the 1970s 
(Layzer 2012). Furthermore, Michaels and Tyre (2012) find that even policymakers are 
frequently stymied by indeterminacy or uncertainty in scientific data. They find that the 
breadth of what is unknown about an ecological system, and its interactions with social 
and political activity predicts how amenable policymakers will be to using scientific 
expertise to make policy. In a collaborative negotiation, this can lead to disagreement 
between groups of opposing viewpoints over how scientific data, and the uncertainty that 
necessarily comes with them, are to be interpreted. It can even lead to disagreements 
over whether enough can be known to determine the proper course of action, or whether 
there is sufficient evidence that the conservation efforts would ultimately prove effective 
or fruitless and wasteful.  
The additional salience placed on the cost of exiting negotiations (the δ term in 
the model) is rooted largely in uncertainty about what will happen if one exits. The key 
variables influencing the value of δ are the sources of this uncertainty. First is the quality 
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and quantity of scientific information available on the policy problem to be addressed, 
and who wins the battle over its interpretation. Second is the level of technical 
complexity of the issue being addressed. Finally, the political climate and uncertainty 
about the political climate also play a role here.  
The implication of this is that wherever one party has an opportunity to gain 
advantage from the data, or lack thereof, they can use this advantage to get more of what 
it wants out of the negotiation, and force the opposing party to accept less. Let’s take 
two hypothetical examples. In the first example, parties are negotiating over policy on a 
relatively straightforward and well-understood problem. There is very little uncertainty 
as to the cause of the problem or the effects of the proposed solutions. There is going to 
be very little room in this scenario for one party to gain advantage by calling the validity 
of the data into question or offering a self-serving interpretation of them. In the second 
example, the same parties might be negotiating over a very contentious policy problem 
in which perhaps they cannot even agree on whether the problem is truly a problem. 
Furthermore, the problem is so complex or poorly understood that scientific data are 
scarce or some question their reliability. Here one group might exploit these 
circumstances to argue that there is no problem, or to argue for a much weaker solution 
than might be called for if the data were better. To put this in the terms of the model 
above, say group B is exploiting this situation to argue for a much weaker course of 
action than was initially proposed, and group C, which prefers a stronger course of 
action, must now decide whether to go along with group B’s proposal or to walk away. 
This uncertainty makes the cost of exit potentially very high.  
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Conclusion 
An expansive literature on collaborative governance and management has made 
substantial contributions to knowledge of how such systems work, particularly regarding 
which variables drive collaboration that results in successful consensus between the 
relevant parties. However, this literature has left open questions retarding the internal 
dynamics of the negotiation and decision-making processes in collaborative governance 
arrangements. We still know relatively little about how conflicting preferences are 
distilled into a single coherent policy through the process of individuals and groups 
choosing to make the specific compromises and concessions. As a result, the field has 
been unable to produce predictive theories of this process.  
The contribution of this project is to address these key shortcomings. Drawing 
from interdisciplinary theories to construct a theory of collaborative decision making 
will shed light into the black box of negotiating collaborative arrangements and 
converting conflicting preferences into a coherent policy over which there is rough 
consensus. Ultimately, one contribution here will be a richer understanding of the 
collaborative process. However, the key contribution will be that, as a result of the first 
contribution, this project will mark a first step toward constructing an integrative theory 
of collaborative governance that allows us to predict, in a given case, the outputs of the 
collaborative endeavor, and maybe in some cases even the outcomes. 
While these contributions will constitute theoretical advances in the scholarly 
community on the topic, they will also have broader implications for the practice of 
collaborative governance. Perhaps most importantly, the project sheds critical light on 
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the internal workings of the collaborative process, which are not always fully exposed by 
proponents of the collaborative approach in practice. Obtaining a better understanding of 
the mechanics of collaborative action, and how these mechanics might work differently 
under different exogenous circumstances, such as under varying degrees of scientific 
uncertainty, might give practitioners a tool for assessing when collaborative governance 
might be a more or less useful tool for organizing collective action. 
Next, I will lay out a research design for gathering empirical evidence to evaluate 
this theory using selected case studies of Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) under the 
Endangered Species Act. I will discuss the case selection and methodology for analyzing 
the cases, as well as a bit of historical context that explains why HCPs are a useful lens 
through which to study collaborative governance.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION 
 
I apply the decision-making theory outlined in the previous chapter to 
negotiations over habitat conservation plans (HCPs) in the U.S. under the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (ESA). I employ a similar systems case study design, analyzing two 
selected HCPs in the state of Florida.  HCPs are useful lenses through which to study 
collaborative governance because they arguably embody the concept better than any 
alternative. As Ansell and Gash (2008, 544) define it, collaborative governance is “a 
governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state 
stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, 
and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public 
programs or assets.” Large-scale HCPs like the ones in the cases I study here meet every 
criterion of this definition. They are cases in which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS), and sometimes state and local agencies, engage private stakeholders—usually 
the building development industry and conservation interest groups—to implement the 
requirements of the ESA and to manage endangered species habitat.  
I conducted in-depth case studies of two HCPs in which the technical 
complexity, scientific uncertainty, and political uncertainty vary widely between the two 
cases. However, in order to hold constant as many other variables as possible I chose 
two cases within the same state and from roughly the same time frame. The Florida 
Beaches HCP (FBHCP) is one of the largest, most complex multi-species HCPs ever 
attempted. It covers a range of species from sea turtles to migratory birds that make their 
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homes along more than 1,200 miles of Florida coastline. The coastal nature of the 
FBHCP brings questions of global warming and sea level rise into the calculus when 
seeking to determine what the range of the species will look like in the future under 
these changed circumstances. The Charlotte County Scrub Jay HCP is meant to protect 
habitat for the Florida scrub-jay from threats related to building development in 
Charlotte County on Florida’s Gulf coast. By comparison to the sea turtles, beach mice, 
and shore birds included in the FBHCP, the scrub-jay’s needs are well understood and 
the agencies involved have lengthy experience in dealing with its habitat conservation. 
While the scrub jay, too, is under threat from the effects of global warming, as are all 
species, especially birds (National Audubon Society 2014), it is not under the same 
direct threat from sea level rise that imperils beach-dwelling species. However, as will 
be shown in the case study, scrub-jay conservation in Charlotte County is equally as 
politically charged and in conflict with development as its counterparts covered by the 
FBHCP.  
 While the research design is a pair of similar systems case studies, in order to 
highlight the disparate results that can be produced by similar political processes, the 
method is a combination of in-depth elite interviewing and archival research. In the next 
section I give a brief background on HCPs, including their origins, purpose, and 
structure, which will help to clarify why they are the ideal testing ground for theories of 
collaborative governance. Next, I give brief introductions to the FBHCP and Charlotte 
County Scrub Jay HCP, including explanations of how each fits into the research design. 
Finally, I discuss the interview and archival methods that I employed. 
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Habitat Conservation Plans 
An HCP is a collaborative partnership between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS)1 and some party or parties seeking an incidental take permit to exempt 
certain activity from the ESA ban on taking listed species. The original ESA, passed in 
1973, outlawed any taking of a species listed as threatened or endangered. With 
frustration mounting among industry over the inflexibility of the act, which culminated 
in national media attention over work stoppage on construction of the Tellico Dam in 
Tennessee, Congress used the 1982 reauthorization as an opportunity to amend the act to 
ease these concerns. Section 10 of the ESA was amended to allow otherwise lawful 
activity to be exempted from the ban on taking listed species through the issue of an 
incidental take permit (ITP). In order to obtain an ITP, an applicant must first create an 
HCP that details the steps the applicant will take to minimize the take and mitigate what 
cannot be avoided. Frequently this tool is used to permit real estate development that 
will result in habitat loss for listed species. Mitigation can come in multiple forms. 
Frequently it is accomplished through setting aside some negotiated amount of land to 
leave undeveloped—with a plan to manage and fund the conservation—or by paying a 
negotiated amount of money into an already existing conservation fund for the affected 
species that is managed by some third party. 
                                                
1	  The	  ESA	  designates	  FWS	  as	  the	  lead	  implementing	  agency	  for	  land-­‐based	  species	  and	  the	  National	  
Marine	  Fisheries	  Service	  (NMFS)	  for	  maritime	  species.	  While	  some	  HCPs	  are	  administered	  by	  NMFS,	  the	  
majority	  of	  HCPs	  are	  for	  species	  under	  FWS	  jurisdiction.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  agencies	  share	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  sea	  turtles	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  FBHCP	  in	  this	  study,	  with	  the	  NMFS	  regulating	  the	  
species’	  breeding	  areas	  at	  see	  and	  the	  FWS	  in	  charge	  of	  its	  nesting	  habitat	  on	  shore.	  However,	  because	  
the	  FBHCP	  only	  concerns	  the	  nesting	  habitat,	  the	  NMFS	  is	  not	  involved.	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 Though originally conceived as a tool for private property owners, over the past 
20 years the use of HCPs has expanded beyond one-off negotiations between individual 
developers and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Now, partially spurred by the 
encouragement of Clinton administration Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, city 
and county governments frequently negotiate large, multi-species, multi-jurisdictional 
HCPs to cover all development activity in a given area (Babbitt 2005). In some more 
recent cases, the scale of these plans has expanded even beyond the local scale. One 
example of this is the FBHCP. Another covers eight Midwestern states that are, as of this 
writing, negotiating what will be geographically the largest HCP to date, whose purpose 
will be to mitigate habitat loss from the construction of wind farms. These large scale 
HCPs become complex collaborative governance undertakings that take years to 
negotiate between the federal government, state and local government agencies, 
developers, conservation groups, and other stakeholders. Key to understanding HCPs is 
identifying their origins. To do this, it is important to understand the amendments to the 
ESA in 1982 and how they became part of the law. 
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973. The act was widely 
considered at the time to be the single most significant piece of environmental legislation 
to date (Czech and Krausman 2001). The law gave authority to the Department of the 
Interior to list threatened and endangered species and to protect them through the listing 
of critical habitat; it also outlawed any unauthorized “taking” of a listed species or its 
habitat. Nine years later, in 1982, Congress passed a series of important amendments to 
the ESA, including the addition of a provision for the Interior Department to grant 
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individuals authority to commit takings that are incidental to otherwise lawful activity in 
exchange for setting up and funding the species’ preservation elsewhere through a 
habitat conservation plan (HCP).  
In 1982, the ESA was up for its triennial reauthorization. Since its original 
passage in 1973, previous congresses and presidents had reauthorized the act in 1976 
and 1979 with little controversy. However, by 1982 political circumstances had changed, 
making this reauthorization much more contentious than it had been in the past. 
Industrial and development interests mobilized and lobbied heavily in Congress and the 
executive branch, hopeful that their complaints about the ESA might fall on more 
sympathetic ears in the newly elected Reagan administration than they had in previous 
ones. One news reporter at the time wrote, “The [ESA]… is itself on the endangered list, 
under the sharpest attack since it was enacted by Congress in 1973” (Peterson 8 March, 
1982). My own interviews with individuals who worked on the ESA on behalf of major 
environmental interest groups during that time confirm these groups were fearful that the 
ESA had become so politically unpopular that Congress might choose not to reauthorize 
it at all. 
A frequent source of negative attention for the ESA at the time was the stoppage 
between 1977 and 1979 of construction on the $129 million (about $465 million in 2015 
dollars) Tellico Dam in Tennessee due to its threat to the only known remaining 
population of the endangered snail darter. This was a contentious issue with developers, 
who found sympathy in the administration and with some members of Congress (“House 
Approves Bill on Endangered Species” 9 June, 1982; Peterson 8 March, 1982; Russakoff 
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6 May, 1982; Shabecoff 23 July, 1981; Shabecoff 8 December, 1981). Other major 
projects had also been slowed by the presence of listed species, including the Dickey-
Lincoln Dam in Maine and a large housing development in California (Webster 1 
March, 1982). Industry proposals for amending the act included one that would limit the 
listing of “lower forms of life,” such as plants and invertebrates, and one that would de-
list the grizzly bear, bald eagle, and sea otter, on grounds that large and healthy 
populations of these animals still existed in Alaska (Peterson 8 March, 1982). 
 Interest groups on both sides of the issue might have been interpreting and 
reacting to signals from the Reagan administration concerning its intentions for the 
future of the ESA. When hearings on ESA reauthorization opened in late 1981, 
administration officials did not offer a position, but instead indicated that they intended 
to “propose substantial changes, including the possible elimination of requirements for 
setting aside ‘critical habitats’ of endangered species” (Shabecoff 8 December, 1981). At 
the same time, Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, “asked for a one-year extension of 
the act [as opposed to the typical three-year reauthorization], saying he [wanted] time to 
find administrative solutions to industry’s problems.” One observer interviewed by a 
newspaper reporter offered his view of the true intentions behind the Interior 
Department’s proposed delay, stating simply, “They want to gut the act” (Peterson 8 
March, 1982). 
This sentiment was not isolated to the one observer. Environmental activists 
accused Secretary Watt of halting the endangered species listing process, citing 44 
species that the Carter administration had found eligible, which had still not been listed 
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as of July 1981. The Environmental Defense Fund sued Watt over what it viewed as his 
agency’s stalling of the listing process. A member of the group’s leadership commented 
publicly that Watt’s failure to list these 44 species “makes us question whether he 
intends ever to protect these species or any others” (Shabecoff 23 July, 1981). The 
Interior Department answered these critiques, arguing that the delay in the listings in 
question was due to the new regulatory impact analysis process mandated by President 
Reagan (Shabecoff 23 July, 1981), which required that the fiscal benefits of preserving a 
species outweigh the costs. Only one species ever cleared this cost-benefit threshold: the 
Hays spring amphipod, whose conservation made no imposition on industry or 
development, as its only known remaining individuals lived in a spring in Washington’s 
National Zoo (Peterson 8 March, 1982). The cost-benefit requirement was later the 
subject of a legislative override as part of the 1982 ESA amendments, which required 
that only biological considerations be given weight in listing decisions (Russakoff 6 
May, 1982). Moreover, the majority of the 44 species in question were Hawaiian tree 
snails; as such, they did not fit with the Reagan administration’s prioritization of birds 
and mammals over “lower forms of life” (“House Approves Bill on Endangered 
Species” 9 June, 1982; Peterson 8 March, 1982; Shabecoff 23 July, 1981; Shabecoff 9 
December, 1981). Finally, in order to list threatened and endangered species, the 
department depends on the fiscal ability to fund population studies that identify them. 
However, the budget for the Interior Department’s Office of Endangered Species was cut 
by more than half, from $4.1 million to $1.9 million, severely curtailing its data 
gathering capabilities (Peterson 8 March, 1982). One Fish and Wildlife Service official 
  43 
commented that the office responsible for monitoring endangered species “would have 
only enough resources to allow about 50 species to be listed each year” (Shabecoff 23 
July, 1981).  
These archived news articles show that the ESA was in a precarious position in 
1981 and 1982, during the reauthorization process. It was under attack from interest 
groups whose immediate incentives do not induce them to prioritize species 
conservation. Exacerbating the situation was the fact that the incoming administration 
was sympathetic to development and industry interests and openly cold to environmental 
regulation on ideological principle. At best the Reagan administration was uneager to 
enforce the law strongly. At worst, it may have actively sought to circumvent the law, as 
some members of Congress accused during 1982 committee hearing over the renewal. 
While admittedly this does not amount to systematic proof that interest group pressure 
and the lack of will to enforce the current law on behalf of the administration provides a 
causal link to the Section 10 amendments as a compromise to save the act from falling 
into complete ineffectualness, it is suggestive. To provide further insight, however, we 
need to know the origin of these amendments. 
Examining transcripts and reports from multiple committee hearings on the 1982 
ESA renewal, I uncovered the source of the proposal to allow incidental takings in 
exchange for setting aside land in a habitat conservation plan. On February 22, 1982, 
Lindell Marsh, an attorney for a firm that “represents landowners and developers on a 
number of projects raising endangered species issues,” testified before the House 
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Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, of the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries.  
In general, we believe that there is a need to formally encourage greater 
cooperation and collaboration between the Federal agencies and the 
private sector on endangered issues, and that the act should be amended 
to encourage such cooperation. We suggest that the Federal wildlife 
agencies be authorized to participate in the development of habitat 
conservation plans initiated by local or State agencies to resolve present 
or potential endangered species conflicts on an area or regionwide basis. 
 
Marsh goes on to testify that this suggestion is modeled after the ongoing effort to 
develop a habitat conservation plan for endangered butterflies in San Mateo County, 
California. This habitat conservation plan was proposed by the environmental consulting 
firm working with the developer of the San Bruno Mountain development, which was 
mentioned in the news coverage of ESA as an example of one of the major projects that 
had been halted by the act. Going back further in the history of the suggestion, Marsh 
claims the idea was originally modeled after the special area management plan (SAMP) 
process that had been previously employed in the Pacific Northwest and that is 
referenced in the Coastal Zone Management Act.  
 The proposal for habitat conservation plans does not seem to have had fierce 
opposition from environmental groups. Previously in the same hearing, Ken Berlin of 
the National Audubon Society testified on behalf of a consortium of environmental 
interest groups: 
There are ways the companies can be creative under the act; for example, 
using section 10 for permits, something you may hear about from the next 
witness [Marsh], where a party could come in and say we have developed 
a management plan that helps that species; therefore, even if we affect 
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parts of the habitat, that is acceptable. We think that is an approach that 
should be considered. 
 
The Fish and Wildlife Service also seemed to be supportive of the proposal. 
Commenting on the development of the San Mateo County HCP, a spokesperson for the 
agency said, “I’ve talked to a lot of people…and everyone feels that [the cooperative 
approach] is really the wave of the future; that the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
environmental groups and the developers will be working together on these conservation 
plans to conserve species—perhaps sometimes instead of listing them as endangered” 
(King 6 February, 1982). Then, in its final report on the amended ESA, the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported:  
For private landowners, the Committee designed a solution through the 
permit provisions of Section 10 by authorizing the Secretary to issue 
permits to individuals who demonstrate that the taking of an endangered 
species will be incidental to, but not the purpose of, the lawful activity 
they will perform. In order to obtain a permit, the private applicant must 
present the Secretary with a conservation plan demonstrating that he will 
minimize the incidental taking, and specifying the number he will likely 
take and any proposed alternatives. 
 
The Florida Statewide Beaches HCP 
In many ways the state of Florida is the archetypal case in the enduring conflict 
between economic development and natural resources conservation. The state’s sub-
tropical and tropical climate, and its approximately 1,500 miles of coastline spanning the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, as well as its vibrant theme park and resort 
industry, make it a major tourism destination. While much of this tourism is generated 
by theme parks, Florida’s biodiversity and natural resources, including its beaches, 
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forests, and the Everglades, also play a role in attracting 80 million visitors to the state 
each year. In addition to tourism, Florida has been experiencing massive growth in 
permanent residents over the past half century (FBHCP Steering Committee n.d. (a)). 
Florida’s population continues to grow at a rapid rate, and more than a fourth of the 
population lives within less than one mile of the coast. It is not surprising, then, that 
demand is high for development of homes, hotels, retail, and restaurants in a convenient 
vicinity to Florida’s beaches. It is also a relatively uncontroversial proposition that it is 
in the state’s best interest economically to develop these facilities in a way that is least 
destructive to the natural resources that make it such a desirable destination. 
 Recognizing the need to strike a delicate balance between meeting development 
demands and conserving valuable natural resources, the Florida legislature in 1965 
passed legislation creating the Coastal Construction Control Line (CCCL) Program, and 
tasked the state’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) with its 
implementation. As the DEP describes the program, “[r]ecognizing the value of the 
state’s beaches, the Florida legislature initiated the [CCCL] Program to protect the 
coastal system from improperly sited and designed structures that can destabilize or 
destroy the beach and dune system.” Much of this activity permitted under this program 
involves the construction of sea walls and other shoreline stabilization efforts. While not 
directly related to building development, these projects’ primary purpose is to protect 
coastal building structures.  
 As of the mid-2000s, Florida’s other environmental agency, the Fish and Wildlife 
Conservation Commission (FWC) had for several years asserted that DEP was 
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permitting activity under the CCCL program that was resulting in take of coastal species 
through habitat loss. During this time, DEP denied that they would ever issue a permit 
that would result in take. Interviews revealed that the conflict here was a matter of 
interpretation. DEP was using a much narrower definition of take than the federal 
government, which did not include loss of habitat that was unoccupied at the time of 
construction.  
 Finally, in 2008, under threat of third-party lawsuits over takings resulting from 
permits issued under the CCCL permitting in violation of the ESA, Florida’s DEP 
agreed to participate in the development of a statewide, multi-species habitat 
conservation plan (HCP), in order to obtain an incidental take permit to exempt the take. 
As of this writing, the Florida Beaches HCP (FBHCP) is still under development, with 
drafts completed for eight of 15 total chapters.  
Organizational Structure of the FBHCP 
 The FBHCP is a quintessential case of collaborative management. At the top of 
its organizational chart is a steering committee comprised of representatives from 
various stakeholder groups, each with an equal vote, which meets quarterly. The steering 
committee operates under strong norms of collaboration and cooperation, and conflict is 
frowned upon. Members of the steering committee are drawn largely from the higher 
ranks of their organizations. The steering committee members who represent state 
agencies tend to be division directors or deputies, and those representing state level 
interest groups tend to be senior members of their organizations’ legislative relations 
divisions. The steering committee supervises, and is advised by, a working group 
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comprised largely of lower-level agency employees and third-party contractors with 
advanced subject matter expertise. The working group occasionally breaks down into 
smaller, subject-focused groups. For example, there is a beach mice subgroup that 
includes members who specialize in beach mice, as well as some outside experts who are 
not regular members of the working group. While the working group does the majority 
of the “heavy lifting,” and the writing of the draft chapters for the HCP, the steering 
committee has final approval over the plan that ultimately will be submitted to the FWS 
for consideration. 
 There is one key limitation at this stage that should be noted. As of this writing, 
there are still a number of very important decisions, over which there is likely to be 
disagreement and controversy, that the FBHCP steering committee has not yet made, 
including the mitigation portion of the plan. The limitation here is that what the FBHCP 
will ultimately look like, including such questions as how much habitat will be set aside 
and how will this be funded, remain open. This is the result of the challenges inherent in 
navigating a planning process as large as this one. When I undertook study of the 
FBHCP, those involved planned to have a completed proposal to submit to FWS at 
approximately the time of this writing. Instead, the process has now been stalled for 
several months due to political circumstances and changes in leadership within DEP, the 
applicant agency. However, there is enough information in the existing documents and 
the interview transcripts to perform some analysis and to draw comparisons between the 
two cases. 
 
  49 
Case Selection 
The FBHCP makes an ideal case for this study because technical complexity and 
scientific uncertainty are high relative to the comparison case. Much like the Charlotte 
County HCP, the primary threat to the included species is construction. However, due to 
the coastal environment and the nature of some of the specific species involved, those 
charged with planning and negotiating the FBHCP are faced with additional layers of 
scientific uncertainty and technical complexity.  
 While the specific needs related to conservation of sea turtles and beach mice are 
relatively well known, interviews revealed that the shore bird and migratory bird species 
included in the plan are relatively more complicated, and determining the right thing to 
do for their conservation is less easily determined. In fact, both the interviews and the 
analysis of original documents revealed that the inclusion of these bird species was the 
subject of debate early in the process.  
 Another layer of uncertainty and complexity in the FBHCP case comes from the 
coastal setting and growing awareness of the impending direct and indirect effects of 
global warming on coastal ecosystems. By direct effects I mean sea level rise, rise of 
ocean temperature, increases in heavy precipitation, and increases in frequency and 
severity of major storms. By indirect effects I mean the human reactions to the direct 
effects, such as increased construction of sea walls and other shoreline stabilization and 
reinforcement efforts. As the incidental take permit to which the HCP will be attached is 
for 25 years, it is fairly certain that conditions will change during the term of the permit.  
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 The scientific uncertainty and technical complexity due to global warming 
quickly become thorny political issues, especially at the highest levels of the planning 
process, in this case the state agency. Like its federal counterpart, DEP is an executive 
agency led by a secretary who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the 
executive. Since the beginning of the negotiations over the FBHCP there has been a 
change in leadership in Florida’s executive branch. The planning process for the FBHCP 
began under the leadership of then-Republican Governor Charlie Crist. Crist, who has 
since changed his party affiliation, has a reputation as a political moderate. His record on 
environmental issues is largely viewed positively even by environmental interest groups. 
The DEP Secretary whom he appointed, who initiated the FBHCP process, is a biologist 
by training, as opposed to a political operative. This sentiment came through in multiple 
interviews with members of prominent environmental groups in Florida and in casual 
conversations with Florida residents. Crist’s successor, Rick Scott, is much more 
conservative by comparison. He was elected in the 2010 midterm election after running 
a campaign in which he repeatedly promised to decrease government regulation, which 
he asserted would make Florida more business friendly. Thus it is not surprising that 
levels of support and enthusiasm in the applicant organization for the FBHCP have 
changed since the beginning of the endeavor.  
Charlotte County HCP 
Charlotte County is one of Florida’s many rapidly growing areas. Situated 
approximately an hour and 30 minutes south of Tampa and St. Petersburg, and 
surrounding the edges of the Charlotte Harbor in the southern portion of the state’s Gulf 
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coast, Charlotte County’s estimated 2014 population is 168,474, about a five percent 
increase over 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2015). Charlotte County is also home to four 
populations of Florida scrub jay, a habitat-specific species endemic to South Florida and 
listed as threatened under both the federal ESA and the state’s equivalent law (U.S. Fish 
& Wildlife Service 1999). The bird’s habitat-specific needs put it in direct conflict with 
building development that clears the oak scrub habitat that it needs.  
 The scrub jay HCP in Charlotte County was given final approval by the FWS in 
2014 and an incidental take permit was issued that allowed building development to take 
about 3,056 acres of scrub jay habitat in exchange for creating and managing a reserve 
of approximately 4,500 acres. However, the HCP took several years to come to fruition. 
Interviews revealed that the idea was first posed in the late 1990s, and the county began 
the process of creating a county-wide HCP. Ultimately, during that process, county 
officials at the time decided for financial reasons to scale back the project to a smaller 
HCP to cover only capital improvement projects (utility and road expansions) within the 
county, and not private development.  
In 2007, after repeated notices from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that 
housing development in the county was causing unauthorized take of scrub jay habitat, 
the county sent notices to all owners of undeveloped lots advising them that they must 
contact FWS before developing their properties. These were predominantly .25 acre 
single home lots that had been purchased by private owners anticipating building homes 
on them. After being bombarded with thousands of phone calls from frustrated property 
landowners, and knowing it did not have the human or capital resources to handle the 
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thousands of individual ITP applications, members of the FWS field office in Vero 
Beach, Florida, convinced county officials that the best solution for all involved would 
be to negotiate a county-wide HCP that would cover development on all affected lots.  
Organizational Structure 
On a structural level, there are key similarities between the negotiations over the 
FBHCP and the Charlotte County HCP. Much of the analysis and drafting of the HCP 
was conducted by a technical advisory committee consisting of agency employees and 
private consultants with technical expertise in different areas of the plan, very similar to 
the working group in the FBHCP. Instead of a steering committee making the final 
decisions on what to submit to the FWS, however, this role was fulfilled by the county’s 
Board of Commissioners. As the top elected officials in the county government, the 
board’s support was required for the HCP to be created and implemented.  
In addition to the input of government agencies and elected officials, the 
technical advisory committee, and the technical consultants, input was sought from 
individual citizens and advocacy groups, including home builders and local 
environmental groups, particularly during the planning of the reserve design. 
Case Selection 
The Charlotte County HCP was chosen as the lower uncertainty scenario for the 
case comparison because it allows several variables to be held constant, while providing 
contrast on the key independent variable. Unlike the FBHCP, the Charlotte County 
Scrub Jay HCP is not the first of its kind or the first HCP completed on this scale scale. 
The species’ needs are known to be quite stringent and inflexible, narrowing the range of 
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mitigation options. The Florida scrub jay is endemic to southern Florida and it has 
already been extirpated from several counties. In Charlotte County much of its habitat 
has already been lost and fragmented, leaving the remaining populations vulnerable. In 
addition to being extremely habitat-specific, the species is long-lived, sedentary, and 
lives in familial communities that stay together (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 1999). The 
habitat is dependent upon frequent fires. Therefore, in addition to habitat loss and 
fragmentation, housing development poses a threat to the habitat through fire 
suppression. The threat to the species in this case is particularly well defined, the HCP 
covers four specific metapopulations of the species in a well defined area (Charlotte 
County Parks & Natural Resources Division 2014), and there is very little ambiguity 
about the species’ prospects in the county under various possible courses of action.  
Interview and Archival Research Method 
I have selected these cases for variation on the key explanatory variable, in this 
case the degree of scientific uncertainty and technical complexity surrounding the 
conservation activity. An important component to this research design is that I selected 
these cases without observing the dependent variable first. As King, Keohane, and Verba 
(1994, 140) explain, this is the best limited-n research design for intentionally selecting 
cases, because only during the research do we learn the values of the dependent variable, 
“and then make our initial causal inference by examining the differences in the 
distribution of outcomes on the dependent variable for given values of the explanatory 
variables.” The research design, then, is a most similar systems design, selected for the 
maximum possible variation in the key independent variable and the least amount of 
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variation on any other variables that could influence the outcomes. I achieve variation on 
the key explanatory variable of scientific complexity and uncertainty by selecting cases 
with obvious differences on this variable. The cases look like the hypothetical example I 
used above, in which a great deal of complexity, uncertainty, and disagreement over 
scientific data and interpretation exists, and the other addresses a relatively simpler, 
better-understood problem.  
 I collected information on these cases using two primary methods, archival 
research and elite interviewing. In the FBHCP case, I was able to collect archival data 
from steering committee meeting minutes, draft HCP chapters, supplemental information 
that was released publically, and presentations given to members of the steering 
committee and other officials. In addition to the archival data, I conducted in-depth, 
face-to-face interviews with individuals who have been involved with the HCP process 
at all levels and from multiple perspectives, including federal and state agencies, the 
various interest groups involved, and private consultants. Similarly, in the Charlotte 
County case, I was able to collect data through original documents. Unfortunately, 
meeting minutes were not available. However, I was able to gather some information on 
what was discussed at meetings from interviews and from presentations made during the 
meetings by various parties involved. Again, in addition to the original document 
sources, I conducted interviews with individuals involved from multiple perspectives 
throughout the process. 
 I will discuss more about the specific methods, the questions asked in the 
interviews, and what the data collection revealed in the following two chapters. In the 
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next chapter, I will present the results of the FBHCP case study. In the chapter that 
follows I will present the results of the Charlotte County study. Finally, in the 
concluding chapter, I will draw comparisons and conclusions from the two cases and 
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CHAPTER IV 
TOO BIG TO SUCCEED? STATEWIDE PROTECTION FOR SEA TURTLES, 
SHOREBIRDS, AND BEACH MICE IN  
 
The Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan (FBHCP) is a planned statewide 
habitat conservation plan that would seek to obtain authorization for take of habitat for 
19 species of turtles, birds, and beach mice that is incidental to construction on Florida’s 
coastline. As of this writing, the FBHCP is still in the negotiation process and a final 
proposal has not been submitted to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for review. 
However, the negotiations over the FBHCP have persisted for more than five years and a 
number of decisions have been made. 
 The FBHCP was chosen as a case study for its high degree of technical 
complexity and uncertainty. There is no example of another HCP that has attempted to 
accomplish what the FBHCP is attempting to do. It is a statewide, multi-species HCP 
that seeks to protect species from direct and indirect threats from multiple types of 
human activity. For the shorebird species in particular, their location and status are not 
well known, largely due to their nomadic and migratory nature (FBHCP Steering 
Committee n.d.(b)). As a result, the data and population models are full of assumptions 
and uncertainty. In addition to the technical complexity, the multi-species, multi-activity, 
and multi-jurisdictional nature of the FBHCP has made it particularly sensitive to 
political opposition from many sources. 
 To conduct this case study, I gathered data about the background and negotiation 
process for the FBHCP using both archival and interview research methods. I conducted 
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in-depth interviews with 15 individuals, all of whom had been involved in the planning 
and negotiation process over the FBHCP. Some are currently involved, while others 
have since moved on to other positions or agencies/organizations and are no longer 
involved in the process. The interviewees represent a broad sampling of the groups and 
governments involved, including federal and state governments, a broad array of interest 
groups, and private consultants who have played advisory roles. In addition to the 
interviews I also gathered information from original documentation that the process has 
produced, including draft HCP chapters, meeting minutes, and issue briefs on various 
matters on which the steering committee has been faced with decisions. 
 While it is difficult to make a final assessment of the outcome of the FBHCP 
because it is not yet completed, the decisions that have been made to this point, as well 
as the current status of the negotiations, provide insights into the negotiation process that 
allow conclusions to be drawn concerning how the findings in this case fit those that 
were expected based on the theory. Because of the complexity involved in the FBHCP, 
the theory would predict that the collaborative process would produce a less successful 
outcome than what would be produced in the less complex comparison case. The 
expected outcome in this case was that the technical complexity would create an 
environment in which the environmental groups were induced to accept decreased 
protection for the species. While that happened in a couple of cases, the most stark 
contrast between this case and the comparison is that the complexity and fear of political 
controversy induced the environmental interests to accept increasingly longer delay in 
acting to protect the species.  
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 In the next section I discuss the background and purpose of the FBHCP, 
including the circumstances leading to its inception. Then I take an in-depth look at the 
negotiation process that has transpired thus far, drawing both from meeting minutes and 
the information gleaned from the interviews. Finally, I conclude with an outline of the 
current state of negotiations over the FBHCP and a discussion of the implications of the 
findings for the theory outlined in Chapter 2. 
Background and Purpose of the FBHCP 
 The Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) Bureau of Beaches 
and Coastal Systems (BBCS) has statutory authority for implementing a state coastal 
construction permitting program called the Coastal Construction Control Line (CCCL). 
This program protects the state’s beaches from “imprudent construction that could 
jeopardize the stability of the beach-dune system, accelerate erosion, provide inadequate 
protection to upland structures, endanger adjacent properties, or interfere with public 
beach access” (FBHCP Steering Committee n.d.(a), 5). The “coastal zone” within which 
activity is regulated under the CCCL program extends from the mean high water line 
landward to the area subject to flooding and erosion from a 100-year storm surge.  
 At some point in the late 1990s or early 2000s, the FWS and its state counterpart, 
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) became aware that DEP 
was issuing construction permits under the CCCL program that were resulting in take of 
listed sea turtle species through habitat loss (FBHCP Interview #4 2014). FWS and FWC 
notified DEP informally that it was responsible for take that resulted from activity that it 
permitted, and for the next several years DEP denied that it would ever issue a CCCL 
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permit that would result in take. However, in 2007 DEP came under the leadership of 
Secretary Mike Sole, a biologist by training. With this change in leadership, FWS and 
FWC were able to convince Secretary Sole that the CCCL program was, in fact, causing 
take (FBHCP Interview #4 2014, #12 2015). Under Sole’s leadership, DEP entered into 
an agreement with these other two agencies for the development of a habitat 
conservation plan (HCP) in order to obtain authorization for take that would protect the 
state from federal sanctions and third-party lawsuits (FBHCP Working Group n.d.).2 
Governance Structure and Representation in the FBHCP 
As habitat management is outside the normal purview of DEP, it enlisted the help 
of FWC as a partner in developing the HCP. However, DEP remains the applicant and 
the HCP is ultimately the applicant’s document. As such, the Secretary of DEP has final 
authority over what is submitted to the FWS for review. Although at the top of the 
organizational chart for the FBHCP, the Secretary has not been involved in its 
negotiation and development. He delegated this to a nine-member steering committee. 
The founding members of this committee were appointed by Secretary Sole in an effort 
to represent the broad range of interested agencies and organizations, as well as technical 
                                                
2	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  while	  the	  primary	  threat	  to	  sea	  turtles	  in	  the	  coastal	  zone	  
is	  shoreline	  development,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  primary	  threat	  to	  the	  species’	  overall	  long-­‐
term	  survival.	  The	  much	  larger	  threat	  that	  the	  turtles	  face	  comes	  from	  fishing	  practices	  
at	  sea.	  As	  the	  Florida	  DEP	  does	  not	  regulate	  these	  practices	  and	  they	  are	  unrelated	  to	  
coastal	  development,	  they	  are	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  FBHCP	  (FBHCP	  Draft	  Chapter	  2).	  
The	  FBHCP	  has	  some	  ability	  to	  preserve	  land	  habitat	  for	  sea	  turtles	  ashore.	  However,	  
relative	  to	  the	  far	  graver	  threat	  that	  sea	  turtles	  face	  in	  the	  water,	  the	  FBHCP	  will	  be	  
relatively	  inconsequential	  in	  determining	  whether,	  or	  how	  long,	  these	  species	  will	  
survive	  before	  human	  activities	  cause	  their	  extinction	  (FBHCP	  Interview	  #9	  2014).	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expertise. The chair of the committee comes from FWC, and the vice chair from DEP. 
The local government perspective is represented by delegates from the Florida 
Association of Counties and the League of Cities, which share a seat. A member of the 
Lee County Tourism Development Council represents the hotel and tourism industry. 
Environmental advocacy groups have two seats on the steering committee, belonging to 
the state chapter of the National Audubon Society and the Sea Turtle Conservancy, 
respectively. A partner from a coastal engineering firm represents the regulated 
community, as coastal engineers are the most frequent applicants for CCCL permits. The 
scientific community is represented by a senior FWC scientist who is a sea turtle expert. 
Finally, a member of the Florida Department of Community Affairs was appointed for 
her expertise in county comprehensive development plans, which were viewed as 
important potential mechanisms for implementation of the eventual FBHCP.3 Largely, 
the steering committee members are drawn from the senior ranks of their respective 
organizations. On the agency side, they tend to be section heads or equivalent. In the 
interest groups they are senior legislative relations staff, and the coastal engineer who 
represents the regulated community is a named partner in his firm. 
 There has been some turnover in these steering committee seats since the 
beginning of the process. The first round of this turnover occurred in 2011. Part of this 
was the result of the election of Rick Scott as Governor and the subsequent appointment 
                                                
3	  In	  2011,	  the	  Department	  of	  Community	  Affairs	  was	  dissolved	  and	  its	  functions	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  newly	  formed	  Department	  of	  Economic	  Opportunity.	  The	  
member	  who	  held	  this	  seat	  reported	  she	  did	  not	  feel	  her	  new	  agency	  was	  appropriate	  
for	  the	  steering	  committee.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  seat	  on	  the	  steering	  committee	  was	  
eliminated	  (Meeting	  Minutes	  August	  30,	  2011).	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of a new DEP secretary. Other turnovers at the same time were merely coincidental. 
However, the turmoil caused by the turnover is illustrative of how complex and 
politically sensitive this process is.  
 In 2011, the chair of the steering committee announced his retirement, the vice 
chair left his position with DEP, the member from the Florida Association of Counties 
left the organization for a new job, and the member from the former Department of 
Community Affairs determined that the new agency into which DCA’s functions had 
been absorbed did not have an appropriate role on the steering committee. According to 
its charter, the steering committee needed a quorum of seven to hold a vote. The charter 
also designated the original steering committee members by name, as opposed to 
agency, organization, or community, and it specifically gave appointment authority to 
the DEP Secretary. The problem became evident when, in discussions on replacement 
members, the outgoing vice chair and DEP representative indicated that the new 
Secretary was neither aware of the steering committee’s existence, nor had he been 
briefed about the HCP (Meeting Minutes June 1, 2011).  
 Remarks in the minutes from this meeting suggest some concern among the 
outgoing DEP member and the other members of the steering committee that the HCP 
might not have the same robust support from the new leadership that it had in the 
beginning. When discussing the procedure for briefing the new secretary on the HCP, 
the DEP representative on the steering committee remarked, “I just don’t know when or 
how that will go” (Meeting Minutes June 1, 2011, 7). The discussion continued, focused 
predominantly on the strategy for convincing the new DEP leadership of the HCP’s 
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importance and its benefits for all involved, especially for DEP and for CCCL 
permittees.  
The committee decided that, in order to avoid this problem in the future and 
make turnover on the committee less tumultuous, the charter should be amended to 
delegate appointment authority to the Deputy Secretary for Regulatory Programs. It was 
also agreed that the charter should be amended so that seats are designated by 
organization or community, rather than individual by name. A consensus was reached 
that briefings with the new DEP leadership would be required to get approval for these 
changes and to ensure there was still support for the HCP. All agreed that the FWS 
should be involved in these briefings in order to explain to the Secretary that DEP is 
responsible under federal law for the take associated with its CCCL program, and why 
an HCP is its best alternative for avoiding federal intervention or third-party litigation. 
However, it was decided that it would be best not to bog down these presentations with 
details that would raise additional questions. Near the end of the conversation the FWC 
scientist on the steering committee summed up the strategy succinctly. “It might not be 
we have to sell all the details of what’s inside the sausage, just that it tastes really good 
and people like it” (Meeting Minutes June 1, 2011, 9). Minutes from a meeting later that 
year indicate that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary were briefed. While they approved 
of the amendments to the charter, appointed new members to the steering committee, 
and allowed the project to continue, some concern remained among steering committee 
members that support within DEP had waned (Meeting Minutes December 14, 2011).  
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This incident in which instability resulted from the first round of turnover on the 
steering committee is important because it illustrates how delicate and politically 
sensitive the process is. The November 2010 election of Rick Scott as Governor of 
Florida brought about significant changes in the orientation of the state’s executive 
branch towards regulatory policy. Scott ran on a platform that was openly critical of 
regulation, and he made promises to reduce regulatory “red tape” for businesses in the 
state (Rick Scott for Governor Campaign 2014). Secretary Mike Sole, a biologist, who 
had been reluctant initially but ultimately was very supportive of the development of the 
FBHCP (FBHCP Interview #4), was no longer at the helm of DEP. Governor Scott 
appointed in his place a corporate environmental attorney from the private sector, 
Herschel Vineyard (Florida Department of Environmental Protection Press Office 2011). 
Given this context it is easy to see why members of the steering committee, who had 
invested years of time and effort into the HCP process at this point, were apprehensive 
about whether the new administration would support their efforts or return to the 
previous policy of ignoring the ESA in CCCL permitting. Negotiating an HCP is a long 
and arduous process that requires the support of elected and appointed political 
principals who naturally turn over with some frequency. As in the FBHCP example, this 
sometimes includes shifts in partisan ideology and attitudes toward regulation. This adds 
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The Negotiation Process 
While the final product of the negotiations over the FBHCP is still uncertain, 
with many important decisions yet to be made—or possibly never to be made—the 
negotiations have persisted for more than five years. In that time, the steering committee 
has considered and reached consensus on some issues, including the biological goal of 
the HCP, the species that will be included, and how take will be calculated for the 
purposes of the incidental take permit (ITP). Understanding how these negotiations 
proceeded, what controversies have surfaced, and how they have been resolved shows 
what the various players are hoping to achieve through the process and how they have 
pursued those goals through the negotiations. 
One of the most important early decision points in the process revolved around 
determining what the goals of the HCP would be, how they would be measured, and how 
specific they would be. The broad goal of the HCP is important because this serves as 
the guiding objective for all of the smaller decisions on specific conservation tactics and 
measures that come later. The FWS issuance criteria for an ITP are broad, leaving 
flexibility in how biological goals are specified. As long as the application meets these 
broad criteria, FWS is required to issue the permit. On minimization and mitigation of 
take, the statutory requirement is ambiguous at best. The requirement is that the 
minimization and mitigation procedures be “the maximum that can be practically 
implemented by the applicant” (U.S. Department of the Interior 1996, 7-3). On the issue 
of take itself, the issuance criteria simply state that the proposed take may not place the 
species in jeopardy. To place a species in jeopardy is “to engage in an action that 
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reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood 
of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the 
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species” (U.S. Department of the Interior 
1996, 7-4). The key point here is that an HCP is not required to contribute to the 
recovery of a species. Rather, it is only required not to reduce the species’ chances of 
recovery.  
This shows the multitude of discretionary issues involved in developing an HCP. 
An applicant has the ability to develop a plan that ranges from providing the bare 
minimum of protection for the species to one that goes above and beyond the 
minimums—and there are good reasons why an applicant might go beyond the 
minimum, even though it usually means additional expense. Additionally, however, the 
vagueness of the minimum requirements provides another point of discretion, leaving 
them open to negotiations with FWS on a case-by-case basis. This was evident in early 
discussions between the FBHCP steering committee and working group. In one of the 
early meetings a steering committee member asked the head of the working group what 
types of discretionary issues were likely to come before the committee for decisions. She 
responded, “Basically the law requires us [to] minimize and mitigate to the maximum 
extent practicable. One decision is, well, what’s practicable?” Another member of the 
working group elaborated, explaining that, while there are specific elements that FWS 
requires to be present in the application, such as adaptive management and unforeseen 
circumstances, the extent to which those elements are developed and much of the 
specific content is discretionary (Meeting Minutes June 3, 2010, 7). 
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 In the case of the FBHCP, the steering committee and working group members 
had discussions in early meetings about whether their HCP would simply meet the 
minimum requirements or would strive to go above and beyond. At this early stage, a 
goal was set out that indicated intent to exceed the minimum requirements. Steering 
committee meeting minutes reveal that all parties involved were supportive of setting a 
goal that included supporting recovery of the species. The environmental groups favored 
this idea for obvious reasons. The regulated community seemed to be supportive because 
its members wanted to create a plan that would be above reproach and that would attract 
as little negative attention as possible from “naysayers” (Meeting Minutes December 16, 
2009, 11). Although, as will be seen as the case unfolds, the greatest threat to both 
consensus and a successful outcome has not been “naysayers” on the environmental side, 
but rather those who fear a large new regulatory program. 
Covered Species  
The limits of the consensus for creating a plan that exceeds minimum 
requirements began to show when deliberations initiated over whether to include 
additional species beyond those absolutely necessary. While the plan was originally 
conceived due to loss of sea turtle habitat, there are other listed species affected by 
development under the CCCL program, as well as candidate species—those not yet 
federally listed but with some probability of being listed in the near to medium term. 
Candidate species present challenges to HCP planners because including them adds 
complexity. More species means more threat assessments, more data to collect, models 
to estimate, and more minimization and mitigation measures. Dealing with these 
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challenges of course brings increased costs and time. However, excluding them risks the 
need for costly, time-consuming amendments in the future. If applicants choose to 
include candidate species they build minimization and mitigation measures for them into 
the plan, just as they do for listed species. Then, in the event that the species is listed 
during the term of the permit, the permittee has to take minimal, or possibly no 
additional actions to obtain authorization for take of the newly listed species (U.S. 
Department of the Interior 1996). While inclusion of nonlisted species is entirely at the 
discretion of the applicant, and does not affect the FWS decision on permitting, it is clear 
that the Service views the inclusion of nonlisted species as a signal that the applicant is 
serious about creating a robust and proactive HCP. One of the reasons they cite for 
inclusion of nonlisted species is “to increase the biological value of HCPs through 
comprehensive multi-species or ecosystem planning that provides early, proactive 
consideration of the needs of unlisted species” (U.S. Department of the Interior 1996, 4-
1). 
In the case of the FBHCP, there were 11 federally listed animal species4 whose 
inclusion in the plan was a foregone conclusion from the beginning because DEP needed 
to obtain authorization for take to protect itself from federal sanctions or third-party 
lawsuits. They included five species of sea turtle, five sub-species of beach mouse, and 
one species of shorebird (the piping plover). However, the working group identified 13 
                                                
4	  There	  are	  also	  three	  federally	  listed	  plant	  species	  included	  in	  the	  plan.	  I	  do	  not	  deal	  
with	  the	  plant	  species	  here,	  as	  the	  ITP	  does	  not	  grant	  take	  permission	  for	  listed	  plants.	  
The	  animal	  species	  are	  the	  central	  species	  of	  import	  for	  the	  HCP,	  and	  the	  vast	  majority	  
of	  the	  negotiations	  over	  inclusion	  and	  calculation	  of	  take	  regard	  animals.	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currently non-listed but imperiled species whose habitat was impacted by CCCL activity 
(FBHCP Working Group 2010). The steering committee had to make the decision on 
which, if any, of these candidate species to include in the HCP. This decision involved 
some lengthy debate and weighing of pros and cons, which also included the debate over 
the length of term for the application. 
The term of the incidental take permit is another matter that is at the discretion of 
the applicant, and the range runs from five years to 100 years.5 The medium-term range 
of 20-30 years has been the most common in county-level cases. However, as this was 
the first statewide HCP, there was no direct precedent to which the steering committee 
could look. While there was a good deal of discussion on the matter, there seemed to be 
very little disagreement and consensus came relatively easily on this matter. The steering 
committee considered three primary alternatives: long term (50-75 years), medium term 
(20-30 years), and a hybrid alternative. The hybrid alternative followed precedent set by 
a Volusia County HCP for beach driving, in which the county initially applied for a five-
year permit as a trial period and then renewed for a longer term, having gained 
experience. The long term alternative was unanimously rejected quickly. The major 
drawback of longer term permits is that, if future circumstances cannot be reliably 
predicted, the FWS requires a robust adaptive management plan to deal with unforeseen 
circumstances. The longer the term, the more robust and detailed the adaptive 
                                                
5	  100	  year	  permits	  are	  rare	  exceptions.	  Generally,	  they	  are	  reserved	  for	  permits	  related	  
to	  logging	  activities	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Northwest,	  where	  impacts	  are	  well	  defined,	  easily	  
quantifiable,	  and	  unlikely	  to	  change	  due	  to	  unforeseen,	  unpredictable	  events	  (Meeting	  
Minutes	  June	  3,	  2010).	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management is expected to be. In the FBHCP case, projections are difficult to make due 
to climate change and other unpredictable events. With climate models, for example, 
even the best ones are only reliable out to about 30 years. Therefore, the options were 
narrowed to two. When members began to realize how long and difficult the renewal 
process would be the hybrid option, which would require the renewal process to begin 
almost immediately upon issuance of the original permit, became unattractive. Thus 
consensus quickly emerged around the medium term option, and a term of 25 years was 
supported by all (Meeting Minutes September 8, 2010).  
With the length of term decided, this gave the steering committee more direction 
as to which of the 13 proposed non-listed species would be sensible to include because 
they could now ask the working group for guidance as to which of those species were 
most likely to be considered for federal listing over the next 25 years. Over this decision, 
those on the steering committee who favored keeping the list of covered species short 
began to use arguments regarding uncertainty and complexity. This emerged both in the 
meeting minutes and the in-person interviews with individuals involved in the 
negotiations.  
In one of the early meetings when the possibility of including non-listed species 
was discussed, the idea was favored by some members of the steering committee. The 
Audubon Society representative remarked that everyone in the room recognizes there are 
impacts to these species through CCCL permitted activities, and she concluded that the 
HCP is a good opportunity to protect the species from these impacts. However, others 
were tentative about adding other species. The consequence of adding additional species 
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is that it draws out the process longer because of the additional data gathering and 
modeling that each additional species requires. This was particularly true of the 
shorebirds that were at issue. In discussion on this issue during one meeting, a biologist 
consultant from the working group explained to the steering committee that on some of 
the species there was such a dearth of information that performing a valid threat 
assessment might be difficult (Meeting Minutes September 8, 2010). Additional species 
also make the process more complex and more expensive to implement in the end, which 
comes with political costs. The DEP representative immediately expressed concern 
about expanding the scope of the HCP beyond what his agency is able to handle, given 
budgetary and human resources constraints (Meeting Minutes February 15, 2010). The 
representative from the Sea Turtle Conservancy expressed concerns about adding time to 
the process. And the coastal engineer on the steering committee was concerned about 
adding too much beyond what the HCP was originally proposed to do. He remarked, 
“it’s not that I don’t agree with all the positives [of adding the additional species], I just 
don’t want us to get too far away from what we set out to try to do. Let’s not try to piggy 
back too much on it” (Meeting Minutes February 15, 2010, 13). 
In addition to concerns over adding technical complexity, cost, and time, 
concerns about politics were brought into the discussion of whether or not to include 
additional species. In spite of the early consensus for creating a robust plan that 
exceeded the bare minimum requirements, some members began to show trepidation 
over the political implications of pursuing that goal. The steering committee members 
representing the Department of Community Affairs and the Florida Association of 
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Counties both raised concerns about political pushback that might result from going too 
far above and beyond the minimum legally required. A member of the working group 
responded that there could be resistance from people who do not want the additional 
mitigation requirements that come along with additional species. The Florida 
Association of Counties representative asked whether it was worth the additional cost to 
protect species that are not even state listed. In response to this, the Audubon Society 
representative cautioned that, just because a species is not listed, does not mean that it is 
doing fine (Meeting Minutes June 3, 2010).  
The decision was made ultimately to include seven of the 13 non-listed species 
that were proposed. The Audubon Society made compromises on the other species under 
pressure from the other members of the steering committee, including the member from 
the Sea Turtle Conservancy, who argued that including all of the additional species 
would increase time and costs due to the technical complexity that would be added. In 
one meeting, the Sea Turtle Conservancy representative remarked that, “for marine 
turtles, it’s pretty straightforward. For birds, there’s a whole suite of activities they’re 
doing on the beach” (Meeting Minutes September 8, 2010, 18). These arguments 
highlighted the uncertainty that is brought into the process by adding the additional 
shorebirds. For example, in addition to just nesting in the coastal zone, birds also forage 
on the beach, which brings issues of indirect impacts from beach cleaning into the 
discussion. They are migratory, so they bring issues of determining temporary impacts 
during specific times of year versus permanent impacts. One interviewee in the summer 
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of 2014 asserted that, had the shorebirds not been included, the process likely would 
have concluded already and the HCP would be complete (FBHCP Interview #9 2014).  
The arguments made by the members advocating caution about including 
additional species largely revolved around the additional data gathering that would have 
to be done in order to calculate take, assess threats, and determine proper minimization 
and mitigation procedures. Arguments were made that protection for some of the 
additional species could be captured through side benefits of the minimization and 
mitigation measures employed for the others, without actually having to include them, 
and the additional data and analysis that would come along with that. The Audubon 
Society member of the steering committee conceded that there could be “umbrella” 
benefits for some of the excluded species. However, she argued that if those benefits 
could be captured it would make sense to include those species in the plan (Meeting 
Minutes September 8, 2010). Ultimately, one interviewee with expertise on the shorebird 
component of the HCP told me, those advocating for the inclusion of the bird species 
had made sacrifices and compromises from what they originally wanted, specifically in 
response to arguments about the complexity and uncertainty of the birds’ needs (FBHCP 
Interview #3).  
The way the compromises on covered species came about is consistent with what 
the theory predicts for this case. A proposal was made to exclude six species that the 
Audubon Society representative on the steering committee wanted to include. She was 
faced with a decision. She could dig in her heels, but this would risk running afoul of the 
group’s strong norms of cooperation, potentially affecting her ability to exert influence 
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later in the process. After all, the groups involved were selected for their perceived 
willingness to cooperate, and groups perceived to be uncooperative or that had 
unrealistic demands were sidelined early in the process (FBHCP Interview #4 2014). Her 
other option would be to exit the negotiations, wait for the plan that excludes the birds to 
be completed and permitted, and then pursue litigation to get protection for the birds. 
This is an unattractive option for multiple reasons. First, it is very costly. Second, in this 
particular instance getting relief through litigation might be difficult unless one of the 
birds actually became federally listed in the meantime. Finally, and most importantly for 
the theory, the outcome becomes very uncertain under this course of action, but the 
worst case scenario here is probably worse from Audubon’s perspective than the 
outcome of making this small compromise. Therefore, as we would expect, the Audubon 
member accepted this loss and remained a part of the negotiations. 
Calculation of Take 
Another important component of the process of creating an HCP is determining 
how take will be measured. This decision has important implications for how protective 
the HCP will be because how much take is estimated determines how much mitigation 
will be completed. If take is underestimated, too little mitigation might be performed, 
resulting in a plan that does a poor job of offsetting impacts on species. Of course, the 
regulated community and DEP in this case are wary of using a method that would be 
broader than necessary because their interests in keeping mitigation costs as low as 
possible will lead them to want the smallest possible estimation of take. Again, this is 
shown in both the meeting minutes and the interview results. 
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It is probably an understatement to say that calculation of take for the FBHCP is 
a daunting task. County-by-county predictions had to be made estimating the numbers of 
various types of structures that would be added to the coastal zone over the next 25 
years. This involves projecting storm activity, erosion, and a best guess at the effects that 
economic booms and busts will have on coastal development. For example, in estimating 
the number of permits for the next 25 years, the working group’s approach was to gather 
data by county on the number of permits over a 10-year period and use that as the 
baseline for projections. They thought this was a sound approach because the period 
included both periods of economic growth and decline. However, they faced criticism 
from the coastal engineer on the steering committee because it also included the 2004 
hurricane season, which was a particularly active one that resulted in extreme levels of 
post-storm activity on the beaches in some counties. He was concerned that this baseline 
would result in overestimating take in these counties (Meeting Minutes March 20, 2012). 
However, beyond the difficulties of fine-tuning the formula itself, a key point of 
debate among the steering committee was determining what forms of take should be 
included in the assessments. Specifically, what had to be dialed in was just how broad 
the definition of take would be. For example, how would the HCP deal with indirect 
impacts from coastal projects, such as lighting, which causes take by disorienting 
turtles? The focus of the division among the steering committee on this issue was how 
broad and inclusive the definition of take should be. Again here, FWS provides some 
basic guidelines, but there is also latitude for the applicant to decide, especially in a case 
such as this one in which there is no precedent to follow. 
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 In discussing indirect impacts, the committee, at least initially, did not have a 
common understanding of what should be considered in assessing the total impact of 
coastal development on the species. On this matter, there was some distance between the 
DEP members of the steering committee and the environmental groups, particularly 
Audubon. Throughout the process, the DEP sought to keep the scope of the HCP as 
narrow as possible to avoid taking on additional regulatory authority that it did not want 
and did not feel it was authorized to take on (FBHCP Interview #3 2014, #9 2014). The 
debate over indirect impacts provides a useful example of this. In one meeting, the 
Audubon member raised concerns over the nomadic nature of shorebirds. Determining 
where they are and where they are likely to be in the future can be difficult. They might 
leave a particular nesting ground one year, but return the next, or a few years later. This 
makes determining which habitat is truly unoccupied can be a thorny problem. If take is 
permitted while a particular area is temporarily unoccupied, there can still be an impact 
on the species. It is still habitat loss. When this issue was brought up, other members 
countered that it was simply too difficult and complicated, and that by making 
conservative assumptions on other measures they would hope to make up for any 
underestimation of take in this regard. Again, as in the deliberation over covered species, 
this was another issue on which compromises were made on protections for shorebirds 
(FBHCP Interview #3 2014, Meeting Minutes December 14, 2011). This is also 
consistent with the theory. Again, as the theory predicts these those seeking the less 
protective course of action used arguments about technical complexity and uncertainty to 
support their case.  
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 In a subsequent meeting, the Sea Turtle Conservancy member brought up the 
issue of indirect take due to disorientations from lighting. Immediately, the DEP member 
did not want to address this issue, arguing that DEP does not have jurisdiction over 
lighting and the agency does not issue permits for lighting under the CCCL program. 
However, others countered, lighting comes along with the construction projects that the 
CCCL program does permit, both in temporary forms during construction and 
sometimes in permanent form as a result of lighting affixed to structures (Meeting 
Minutes March 20, 2012). The Audubon member expressed her view here that even 
broader indirect impacts were being overlooked, including the impacts of dogs, cats, and 
raccoons. Similar to lighting, these are things that come along with coastal development 
and present a threat to the imperiled species, but that are not explicitly regulated in 
CCCL permitting. The argument, from the Audubon perspective, was that there would 
be opportunities on the mitigation side here by building incentives into the HCP for 
people to keep domestic animals off the beach and to use locking trashcans to avoid 
attracting other predators such as raccoons. Again here, the DEP and some others on the 
steering committee argued that these were outside the scope of what the HCP was 
originally supposed to do, as well as beyond what DEP was interested in doing (Meeting 
Minutes March 20, 2012). Ultimately, DEP relented and agreed to include lighting and 
other indirect impacts, such as pets, into the assessments of threats to the species 
(FBHCP Steering Committee n.d.(c)). 
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Legislative Changes 
As of the time of this writing, progress on the FBHCP is at a standstill. Eight out 
of 15 total chapters have currently been drafted. Three of the most important chapters in 
assessing how robust the plan will be have not yet been written, including the chapters 
that detail the minimization and mitigation procedures, as well as the one that outlines 
the adaptive management strategy. According to interviews, some of the reasons for the 
stall are unavoidable elements of the process. For example, the contract for the main 
third-party consulting group that has been doing much of the analysis for the working 
group, has expired and there have been administrative delays in getting the contract 
renewed. According to the same interviewee, additional rounds of turnover within DEP 
have caused further shake-ups on the steering committee, which have resulted in delays 
(FBHCP Interview #12 2015).  
 Another reason for the delay, however, is that DEP is in the unenviable position 
of being an environmental agency attempting to expand its regulatory authority under 
the leadership of a very conservative governor and legislature. From the perspective of 
DEP, certain legislative changes must be made in order to give the agency legal 
authority to implement the HCP once it is approved by FWS. The agency’s current 
statutory authority only allows it to regulate for the protection of sea turtles, and not the 
other species involved (FBHCP Interview #5 2014). According to the interviews, this 
has been a source of some consternation even among the members of the steering 
committee. One member of the steering committee reasoned that the legislative changes 
were completely unnecessary because DEP has statutory authority to implement the 
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CCCL program. Implicit in that mandate, according to this member, is authorization for 
whatever the agency must do in order to implement the program without running afoul 
of federal law (FBHCP Interview #9 2014). This came up in other interviews as well. A 
member of the working group was also unconvinced that statutory changes were 
necessary, but deferred to the opinion of DEP (FBHCP Interview #11 2015). Another 
interviewee told me that contacts inside DEP had indicated that they are beginning to 
view the FBHCP as “an exercise without a final solution” (FBHCP Interview #8 2014). 
 While the need for statutory changes turns up in the meeting minutes as early as 
2010, and there is general agreement on a strategy of reaching out to legislative staff as 
soon as possible (Meeting Minutes February 15, 2010), this has not happened yet as of 
the summer of 2015. In the minutes from a later meeting in 2010, the question of when 
to begin reaching out to legislators came up again, and this time the DEP member argued 
that they should not rush into it because questions would likely come up that could not 
be answered yet, as the process was not far enough along (Meeting Minutes June 3, 
2010). The following year, the issue was raised again and the head of the working group 
stated, “As far as the plan for legislators, at the outset there was a desire from the 
Steering Committee to take it to them sooner, but the feeling I’m getting now is to wait 
we get into more of the implementation strategy” (Meeting Minutes February 22, 2011).  
 While perpetual delay in moving forward with the HCP is not what was expected 
from the beginning based on the theory, it is an outcome nonetheless. Moreover, this 
outcome is consistent with the theory. The acceptance of marginally further delay at 
multiple points in the negotiations is consistent with the type of procrastination behavior 
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that the theory predicts for a highly complex case such as this one. The incentives for 
DEP to delay continually are fairly straightforward. The agency is in a position in which 
neither of its options is especially attractive, but the option of delay is clearly the more 
attractive of the two. At this point, at each point in the negotiations in which delay is 
extended, the other interests involved must decide whether to accept the delay or to 
pursue their alternate options, which would likely involve leaving the negotiation 
process and taking legal action against DEP for its failure to comply with federal law. 
However, the latter option here is unattractive not only because of reluctance to part with 
the sunk costs accrued during years of negotiations, but also because of the extreme 
amount of uncertainty concerning what outcome such an action might trigger. I discuss 
this further in the next section, including an outline of the various possible outcomes, 
should the HCP fail, all of which are likely to be unattractive from the perspective of 
both FWS and the environmental interests.  
Conclusion 
The picture of the FBHCP that emerges from the current state of its planning 
process suggests that, if a completed plan emerges, it is likely to be less robust than what 
was proposed at the outset, due to some compromises that have been made. One caveat 
to this is that the FBHCP steering committee was hand selected at the outset to minimize 
conflict and maximize consensus, thus minimizing the need for compromise. One 
interviewee who was involved in the earliest stages of the process indicated that 
meetings with broad participation were held early, but that ultimately the moderate 
groups and individuals pushed out the “extremists.” Some of the groups with more 
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forceful views, including environmental groups, the Chamber of Commerce, and beach 
access advocates, chose not to participate any longer once they felt their concerns had 
been heard. This interviewee also estimated that the level of shared values among those 
who ended up on the steering committee was around 70% (FBHCP Interview #4 2014).  
 Given that there was less need for compromise than anticipated to reach 
consensus on the specifics of the plan itself, it is not surprising that in the relatively few 
decisions that have been made we do not see drastic shifts. We do see that the 
environmental groups have, as expected, appeared to compromise more than any other 
interests represented in the negotiations. The Audubon Society, in particular, 
compromised on the covered species. Both groups were pressured to accept standards for 
calculation of take that they believed to be too narrow, though they appear to have won 
that battle for now. Although, fear that decisions like this might be reversed if they were 
to exit the negotiations to pursue legal action is likely one of the factors pushing these 
groups to accept perpetual delay rather than to use the legal tools at their disposal to try 
to push things along. 
One source of the delay is the additional requirements brought on by the 
technical complexity. However, another is the political complexity that is exacerbated by 
technical complexity. A theme that emerges in the meeting minutes is an acute 
awareness among all involved that once the public became aware of the FBHCP, and 
specific details about this new regulatory framework were divulged, there might be 
strong opposition from various sources. This is reflected in the reluctance to brief the 
new DEP Secretary on the project in 2011. It is also reflected in discussions between the 
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steering committee and working group concerning specific language in the draft chapters 
and in a primer on the HCP that was prepared at one point to begin getting information 
out to the public. The steering committee went to painstaking detail to ensure there was 
not language in that document that would set off alarm bells for any particular group, 
and that ultimately the HCP was framed as a tool for streamlining permitting, rather than 
creating new regulations to protect species (Meeting Minutes February 22, 2011). 
Multiple interviewees reiterated the importance that the HCP be “sold” to legislators and 
the public as regulatory streamlining, rather than as a new regulation. One even noted 
that if it were to end up being pitted as a fight between species and beach access, the 
species would surely lose (FBHCP Interview #1 2014, #2 2014, #3 2014).  
Another example of anxiety over political backlash comes from the discussion of 
the draft chapter considering alternative courses of action to the HCP. FWS requires an 
alternatives analysis chapter with the HCP that considers the recommended alternative 
(the HCP), the no action alternative, and other alternatives for addressing the problem. 
The chapter is largely a formality. It is obvious that the HCP will be the preferred 
alternative, the no action alternative has already been determined to be untenable, and 
the other alternatives considered do not even have to be realistic (Meeting Minutes 
March 20, 2012). However, it is a requirement in order for the proposal to be considered 
complete. One concern among some members of the steering committee was, what if 
members of the public, the leadership within DEP, or legislators see these other 
alternatives and find one of them more attractive than an HCP? This came up with 
regard to one alternative in particular that the working group had included, which was 
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the abolishment of the CCCL program altogether. This would presumably devolve 
coastal construction permitting authority to county and local governments, which would 
then be responsible to the federal government for the associated take. No member of the 
steering committee openly favored this option, but some worried that others might, and 
that treating it as a viable alternative would undermine their preference to present the 
plan to the public, legislators, and DEP leadership as a fait accompli, with no other 
credible alternatives. The chair of the steering committee remarked, “what jumps out to 
me is that prior to getting this to the Feds it has to run the gauntlet of State politics” 
(Meeting Minutes March 20, 2012, 14). 
 This illustrates how susceptible the FBHCP is to toppling under the weight of 
political interests and expectations. With a plan this large and comprehensive, there is no 
shortage of constituencies to offend. Political scientists will not find this result 
surprising, as they have long known that an increase in the number of veto players 
whose approval is required decreases the probability of approval (Tsebelis 1999). The 
process of planning and gaining approval for the FBHCP is rife with veto players, both 
formal and informal. As an example, one steering committee member who was 
particularly pessimistic that the plan would ultimately come to fruition raised the 
hypothetical that, if for some reason the Disney Corporation decided to oppose the HCP, 
it could likely singlehandedly kill it. The same might be true of the Home Builders 
Association, which to date has not been involved in the process (FBHCP Interview #8).  
 With the lack of substantive decisions in many instances in this case it would not 
be accurate to say that the environmental groups have been induced to retreat from their 
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ideal points through a series of marginal decisions, from a substantive standpoint. 
However, much of the compromise from the conservation groups’ ideal points that has 
taken place has been from a temporal standpoint, in continuing to accept the perpetual 
delay. This is a movement away from the stated goals of the conservation groups 
because it is the worst possible outcome for the preservation of habitat for the species.  
While the HCP is tied up in negotiations and political stalling, the status quo—
unmitigated take—continues. Eventually, if the HCP fails to come to fruition, DEP will 
be forced to act either by federal enforcement action, third-party lawsuit, or both. In this 
case, DEP would probably simply refuse to issue CCCL permits that might cause take 
until the individual permittee has cleared his or her activity through FWS by obtaining 
an individual incidental take permit. This outcome has serious drawbacks for both 
permittees and the species. It is likely to be a far more expensive and time-consuming 
process for permittees. For the species, it will result in less robust protection because a 
patchwork of individual HCPs will fragment the habitat, as opposed to a comprehensive 
HCP, which would allow for larger parcels of habitat to be protected. In some cases 
individual counties might move to create county-wide HCPs to cover CCCL permitting. 
This would likely be a slightly better option than project-by-project permitting. The 
process could also likely be simplified because much of the rich county-level data that 
the FBHCP working group collected could be used in these county level plans. However, 
there is no guarantee that all 25 counties would do this. Even if they were to do so, 
getting all of these county level plans in place would take several more years, during 
which unmitigated take would likely continue. 
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The theory outlined in Chapter 2 builds a framework for predicting when 
collaboration is likely to produce a successful outcome, as opposed to an unsuccessful 
one. From that perspective, these probable outcomes for the FBHCP are unsuccessful 
ones. As the theory predicts, the technical complexity resulted in barriers to successful 
collaboration by creating an environment in which it is difficult for those favoring the 
more protective outcome for the species to exert influence and resist efforts to weaken or 
delay the process. 
 The lesson from the FBHCP is that the political complications that come along 
with a project of this scope and complexity have created perverse incentives for the 
agency responsible for moving it forward. The Florida DEP is in the unenviable position 
of angering political principals or facing federal sanction and/or third-party litigation for 
being noncompliant with federal law. Holding up the HCP is its best option at this point 
because it can delay both of these consequences, perhaps until another transition in the 
executive branch. From the perspective of FWS and the conservation groups, they could 
exit the process and take action against DEP, invoking one of the alternatives discussed 
above. However, these alternatives are costly, only marginally better than the status quo, 
and the outcomes of them are uncertain at best, terrible at worst. Thus it is not surprising 
that they choose to hold out hope that the HCP will begin moving forward again and to 
continue with the process in which they have invested years of effort at this point.  
 In the next chapter I discuss the much simpler case of the Charlotte County Scrub 
Jay HCP, and show how different the outcomes are in a case that is much less complex, 
and of smaller scope and scale. Then, in the final chapter I make comparisons between 
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the two cases and draw conclusions regarding the implications of the findings for the 
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CHAPTER V 
RESCUING THE FLORIDA SCRUB-JAY FROM CHARLOTTE COUNTY’S WEB 
OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter analyzes the negotiation process and results that were produced by 
the Charlotte County Scrub-Jay Habitat Conservation Plan. The Charlotte County case 
provides a contrast to the Florida Beaches HCP in the previous chapter because, unlike 
the shorebirds that have been the source of a great deal of political consternation and, 
ultimately, inaction in that case, the Florida Scrub-Jay is an extremely well understood—
if equally imperiled—species, whose conservation needs are as uncomplicated as they 
could be from the standpoint of scientific uncertainty.  
 Charlotte County on Southwest Florida’s gulf coast is a rapidly growing area in 
which the survival of the federally listed Florida Scrub-Jay—the state’s only endemic 
species—is in direct and inflexible conflict with increasing development. Residential 
development has fragmented the habitat of this sedentary and habitat-specific species to 
the point where it is on the brink of being extirpated from the county, as it already has 
from nine other counties in the state (U.S. Department of the Interior 1999). However, 
the county government entered into a partnership with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
to attempt to conserve the remaining populations in the county by developing a county-
wide habitat conservation plan. As the first county-wide HCP for the Florida Scrub-Jay, 
the Charlotte County plan is pioneering and may ultimately become a model for the 
remaining counties in the state that are also dealing with conflict between development 
and these birds. 
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 In what follows I analyze the Charlotte County HCP in detail, asking whether it 
faces the same struggles with regard to political delay and continual compromise on the 
part of the environmental interests with which the Florida Beaches HCP has endured in 
its effort to protect imperiled coastal species throughout the state. In the next section, I 
introduce the background of the Charlotte County HCP, including the story of its 
inception, its organizational structure, and a brief introduction to the Florida Scrub-Jay 
to explain why this HCP is a useful case study for evaluating the theory. Next, I discuss 
the negotiation processes that produced consensus between the various interests involved 
on the final plan. Finally, I explain the outcome that the collaborative governance 
process produced in this case, before concluding with some remarks on what the 
findings mean for the evaluation of the theory. 
Background 
Charlotte County, Florida lies on peninsular Florida’s Gulf coast, about 90 
minutes south of the Tampa Bay area. With a 2014 estimated population of 168,474, the 
county is small but quickly growing, with building development proceeding at a rapid 
pace, as it is throughout most of the state (U.S. Department of Commerce 2015). The 
history of development in Charlotte County dates back to the 1950s, when the General 
Development Corporation bought hundreds of thousands of acres of land throughout the 
state and subdivided them to build communities. As a result, much of Charlotte County 
is divided into quarter acre residential lots, some of which have been developed, while 
others are owned by individuals who plan to build houses on them in the future 
(Charlotte County Interview #1 2013). The conflict arises when people prepare to build 
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on their lots and are told they must get clearance from the Fish and Wildlife Service for 
potential impacts to scrub-jays. This conflict set the stage for what is now the Charlotte 
County Scrub-Jay HCP. 
The origins of the Charlotte County HCP were similar in some regards to those 
of the statewide Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan (FBHCP). In the early 1990s 
it came to the attention of staff in the Vero Beach, Florida field office of the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) that residential development was taking place in Charlotte 
County, specifically in areas that were home to the county’s remaining populations of 
the Florida Scrub-Jay, which is federally listed as threatened under the Endangered 
Species Act (Charlotte County Parks & Natural Resources Division 2013). The response 
of FWS was to contact the county officials responsible for issuing building permits to 
inform them that the county is liable for take of habitat for listed species. The county 
responded by sending letters to all owners of undeveloped residential lots, notifying 
them that before they could build on their lots they must contact the FWS (Charlotte 
County Interview #1 2013, #2 2015, Charlotte County Parks & Natural Resources 
Division 2013). FWS was inundated with inquiries and knew it could not process all of 
those applications for individual incidental take permits (ITPs). The situation was 
equally untenable for private landowners. Individuals were faced with the prospects of 
paying as much as $69,000 to develop an individual HCP for a lot that was worth only 
$2,000 to $3,000 (Charlotte County Interview #2 2015).  
In 2004, FWS convinced the county Board of Commissioners that the solution 
was to develop a county-wide HCP, which would give umbrella permitting for all 
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residential development in the county. However, after being plagued with funding issues 
(Charlotte County Interview #2 2015) and poor relations between the county 
commission and FWS (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013), the county’s board of 
commissioners took out the residential development component of the HCP and 
proceeded with a much more limited one that only covered four capital improvement 
projects in the county (Charlotte County Parks & Natural Resources Division 2013). 
This left the position of both landowners and FWS unchanged until, in 2007, 
turnover on the Board of Commissioners and repaired relations between the county and 
FWS led the board to direct county staff to begin the process of preparing a county-wide 
HCP for residential development (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013). The HCP was 
completed and the application for ITP submitted to FWS in March 2013, and it was 
approved and the ITP issued in December 2014. 
Organizatinal Structure 
Like the FBHCP, the majority of the labor of developing the Charlotte County 
HCP was done by a technical advisory group. However, in this case the technical group 
served in a sort of hybrid capacity as both working group and steering committee. This 
group would meet at various stages throughout the process to discuss the status of the 
plan and where to go next. The group consisted of two employees from the Charlotte 
County Parks and Natural Resources Division, a Florida Scrub-Jay expert from the 
state’s Archbold Biological Station, and representation from FWS, the Florida Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC), development interests, and environmental 
interests. This is the core stakeholder group that developed the HCP. The committee then 
  90 
brought the plan before the county Board of Commissioners for final approval (Charlotte 
County Interview #2 2015). 
The Florida Scub-Jay (Aphelocoma coerulescens) 
To understand why the Charlotte County Scrub-Jay HCP makes a useful case for 
evaluating the framework in Chapter 2, it is helpful to introduce a bit of background on 
the species itself. The species6, endemic to peninsular Florida, is a holdover species of 
the xeric oak scrub habitat that historically covered much of the region, characterized by 
infertile, well-drained sandy soil and various types of dry shrub ground cover (U.S. 
Department of the Interior 1999). Some of the more human-like life history 
characteristics of the Florida Scrub-Jay provide insight into why the species is in such 
inflexible conflict with building development. It is stubbornly sedentary. Scrub-Jay pairs 
mate for life, live together in families with the fledglings staying on as helpers until it is 
time for them to pair off and start their own families, they remain in the same territory, 
and are relatively long-lived, living as long as 15.5 years (Charlotte County Parks & 
Natural Resources Division 2013, U.S. Department of the Interior 1999).  
The Florida Scrub-Jay shares some key similarities with the shorebirds that have 
proven to be a major complicating factor for the FBHCP. One of the key similarities 
                                                
6	  Given	  the	  geographical	  specificity	  in	  its	  common	  name,	  it	  might	  seem	  likely	  that	  the	  
Florida	  Scrub-­‐Jay	  is	  a	  subspecies	  of	  some	  larger	  group	  making	  up	  the	  scrub-­‐jay	  species.	  
It	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  two	  other	  types	  of	  scrub-­‐jay,	  whose	  range	  covers	  much	  of	  the	  far	  
western	  United	  States	  and	  Mexico,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  a	  more	  distant	  relative	  of	  the	  blue	  
jay.	  For	  much	  of	  recent	  history	  it	  was	  officially	  considered	  a	  subspecies.	  However,	  due	  
to	  “genetic,	  morphological	  and	  behavioral	  differences”	  between	  the	  Florida	  Scrub-­‐Jay	  
and	  its	  western	  cousins,	  the	  American	  Ornithologists’	  Union	  gave	  it	  full	  species	  status	  in	  
1995	  (U.S.	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior	  1999,	  4-­‐262).	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they share is their severely imperiled status. Also like shorebirds, and all the other 
species in the FBHCP, the Florida Scrub-Jay is a charismatic species that draws support 
for its protection from environmentalists and wildlife enthusiasts, as well as detractors 
who question its worth (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013, #2 2015). However, the 
species also differ in important ways. First, rather than being directly coastal, the Scrub-
Jay occupies higher and dryer territory in the inland parts of the county, leaving its less 
directly vulnerable to the impacts of rising sea level due to climate change (Charlotte 
County Interview #2 2015). There is, however, some long-term risk as rising sea level 
pushes building development inland, though this is not considered a direct threat during 
the 30-year term of the initial ITP (Charlotte County Interview #3 2015).  
The Florida Scrub-Jay is also set apart from the shorebirds of the FBHCP by 
some key differences that bring the two cases into stark contrast on the key independent 
variable, technical complexity. Unlike the shorebirds, the Florida Scrub-Jay’s needs and 
activities are exceptionally well known and understood. One interviewee who has spent 
decades studying this species and others as a biologist, told me that more is known about 
the Florida Scrub-Jay’s life history than any other threatened bird in the state (Charlotte 
County Interview #3 2015). One reason for this is that it has been a well studied species 
for a long time. Another reason, however, is the nature of the species itself. Unlike its 
distant shore-dwelling relatives, the Florida Scrub-Jay is sedentary and extremely habitat 
specific. When development encroaches on a scrub-jay family’s territory the jays will 
not move, and they will not adapt to a different habitat. They will stay until they 
eventually die out (U.S. Department of the Interior 1999). 
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The species is thus extremely inflexible, which puts it in unyielding conflict with 
construction development. However, these same characteristics make assessments of 
what the species needs in order to be conserved very straightforward and certain. It is 
well established in scientific literature, for example, that an effective Florida Scrub-Jay 
reserve design should include about 300 hectares of xeric oak scrub habitat, containing 
15 to 30 territories, located within four kilometers of at least one other population also 
containing 30 territories at 10 hectares per territory (U.S. Department of the Interior 
1999). Because the Scrub-Jay is neither a migratory nor a habitat shifting species, 
population assessments can be made very easily, and survival models can be constructed 
without the need to fill them with assumptions. Thus the territories of Charlotte County’s 
three remaining Scrub-Jay populations are known precisely and will not change 
unpredictably in future years (Charlotte County Interview #3 2015). This might seem 
like a lot of technical minutiae, however it is included to convey how highly specific, 
inflexible, and well known the species’ needs are. This is what makes a Florida Scrub-
Jay HCP like the one in Charlotte County an ideal case for the low technical complexity 
condition to evaluate the theory. While many of the other conditions are the same or 
similar, the baseline conditions of uncertainty and technical complexity with regard to 
conserving the species could not be more different between the FBHCP and the 
Charlotte County case. 
Negotiations 
Of course, the certainty of the location, status, and conservation needs of the 
Florida Scrub-Jay in Charlotte County did not spare this HCP planning and negotiation 
  93 
process from its share of political controversy and fighting. The species has few friends 
in the local development community or on the county’s Board of Commissioners. 
However, these conditions meant that in the debate over the design of the HCP itself, 
conservationists and scientific experts—who had the benefit of unassailably accurate 
data on their side—had the high ground from the beginning.  
 While once the negotiation process began moving forward it produced a 
consensus that provides relatively robust protection for the species7, getting to a point 
where there was consensus that an HCP was the best course of action was difficult and 
contentious. In fact, two interviewees who were involved in the Charlotte County HCP 
from the beginning to the end told me that getting the process started was actually where 
most of the conflict took place (Charlotte County Interview #2 2015, #3 2015). As 
mentioned above, interviews also revealed that relations between the county and FWS 
were deeply strained from the beginning (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013), and that 
one impetus for finally moving forward with the HCP was turnover on the Board of 
Commissioners and subsequent repairing of relationships.  
However, even the new Board of Commissioners was hesitant to direct the staff 
to pursue an HCP for two reasons. First, members viewed it as an unfunded federal 
mandate. Second, they viewed it as a regulatory taking because they were concerned it 
                                                
7	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  remaining	  populations	  of	  Florida	  Scrub-­‐Jays	  in	  
Charlotte	  County	  are	  in	  such	  a	  dire	  condition	  that	  their	  long-­‐term	  survival	  is	  not	  
guaranteed	  even	  under	  the	  most	  protective	  possible	  preserve	  design.	  As	  one	  
interviewee	  remarked,	  while	  the	  HCP	  will	  provide	  some	  protection	  and	  it	  is	  the	  best	  
that	  could	  be	  done	  at	  this	  point,	  it	  came	  about	  10	  years	  too	  late	  to	  have	  the	  best	  
chances	  of	  saving	  the	  species	  (Charlotte	  County	  Interview	  #3	  2015).	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would decrease citizens’ property values (Charlotte County Interview #2 2015). To 
convince them, FWS employees reached out to a group of core constituents that they 
knew held political capital with the commissioners, and brought them on board. This 
group included local realtors and the Home Builders Association (HBA) (Charlotte 
County Interview #2 2015). Both of these are organizations with historically contentious 
relations with FWS, and were initially hesitant to support the development of the HCP. 
In fact, according to one interviewee, early in the process the local realtors had been a 
chief source of disseminating bad information about the HCP to county citizens 
(Charlotte County Interview #1 2013). However, FWS was able to build some level of 
trust with these groups, and then was able to explain to them what an HCP was and what 
the benefits of it would be to developers and property owners. The primary benefits for 
these groups is that it streamlines the development permitting process because the 
minimization and mitigation is done up-front, and therefore there is no need to get 
clearance from FWS on each individual project. Also, because the mitigation for all of 
the development is done together at once, the overall cost of mitigation is drastically 
reduced due to economies of scale. These groups, whose opinion carried a good deal 
more weight with the members of the Board of Commissioners than did those of FWS 
and environmentalists, were then able to convince the Board that a county-wide HCP for 
residential development was the best thing to do for the citizens of the county and those 
who have financial interests in building development, regardless of what they thought 
about the birds (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013). 
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Unfortunately, the same fine-grained detail that was available for much of the 
FBHCP negotiations through the steering committee meeting minutes is not available 
here because the technical advisory committee which did most of the negotiating did not 
keep formal minutes. Thus the best information available on the content and tone of the 
negotiations is from the perceptions of the interviewees who were involved, and is based 
on what they were willing to share. 
The first thing that had to be accomplished before the negotiations could begin 
was to establish a baseline. This involved first conducting a new Scrub-Jay population 
survey within the county to update knowledge of how many families there were, where 
they were, and where there was still viable habitat (Charlotte County Interview #3 2015). 
The subsequent population viability assessment then became the primary guiding 
information source for designing the preserve (Charlotte County Interview #2 2015, #3 
2015).  
The first matter that had to be negotiated and debated among the group arose 
when the analysis showed that there were still three main populations of jays in the 
county, but that one of them was not viable over the long-term because its territory was 
already too densely developed. This population in the western portion of the county once 
had about 300 acres of territory. However, now about half of that is developed (Charlotte 
County Interview #2 2015). One of the key requirements for managing Scrub-Jay habitat 
is periodic prescribed burning to prevent the brush from becoming overgrown (U.S. 
Department of the Interior 1999). For obvious reasons, this cannot be done in areas that 
are already developed with homes. Therefore, acquiring additional land in that particular 
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area to try to conserve that population of jays would have been impractical and, 
ultimately, not biologically beneficial because that population would eventually die off 
anyway.  According to two interviewees, there was some pushback from environmental 
groups who wanted to acquire preserve space for this population (Charlotte County 
Interview #2 2015, #3 2015). This is one area in which the environmental interests had 
to make a concession away from what they ideally wanted. The needs of the species and 
the status of the population are so certain and specific, that it made little sense from a 
biological or financial perspective to focus any effort on saving a population that was 
doomed regardless of how much land could be acquired for it. As one biological 
consultant remarked, this was less a compromise than a limitation. “We wanted to buy 
everything but it was futile to buy land in places that you still wouldn’t have a viable 
population” (Charlotte County Interview #3 2015). 
Interviewees attested that, as expected, those with financial interests, such as 
home builders and realtors, were often reluctant to come alone, and as expected they 
wanted the plan to have the smallest possible impact on their interests. From the 
perspective of the home builders, they wanted to ensure that fees would remain as low as 
possible and that the jays would no longer interfere with development. The realtors were 
predominantly concerned with effects on property values (Charlotte County Interview #3 
2015). These concerns were legitimate. Values of properties in the Scrub-Jay review 
area did decrease when the process began. The county addressed these concerns by 
discounting property tax assessments for these properties. Though now that the HCP is 
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in place the values of those properties should rebound and those tax discounts will expire 
(Charlotte County Interview #1 2013).  
Outcomes 
In spite of these few concessions that had to be made, including some financial 
concessions by the county and the compromise by environmental groups on the doomed 
population of jays, there was very little difference between the starting point of 
negotiations and what was ultimately submitted as the completed HCP. It is important to 
note that one key reason for this is that by the time this process began—10 years too late 
according to one interviewee—there were few options remaining for an effective reserve 
design. However, another reason is that the certainty and specificity concerning the data 
and the needs of the species played the expected role in the Charlotte County case in that 
it left very little room for negotiation. Because the data were so reliable, the same kinds 
of arguments about uncertainty and complexity that have beleaguered the FBHCP case 
could not be made in Charlotte County. One interviewee, when asked if there was any 
difficulty getting any of the stakeholder groups to accept the science, or any quibbles 
over the interpretation of data, said that there was some learning curve on the technical 
aspects of the plan, particularly with the realtors and home builders. However, they were 
able to explain the big picture of the plan and establish a baseline of trust with these 
groups such that they “trusted that we weren’t just making things up” (Charlotte County 
Interview #2 2015).  
One important way in which certainty affected the final reserve design was that 
the science experts were able to set the most robust design possible as the baseline 
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design. They were then able to sell that to the Board of Commissioners as the worst-case 
scenario. After the initial population survey and viability analysis were complete, the 
biological consultant prepared a recommended reserve design for presentation to the 
board that included the most robust protection possible which, from their perspective 
was the worst-case scenario because it also was the most costly option. They specifically 
presented that baseline to make the remainder of the process as predictable as possible so 
there would not be any surprises. It also allowed them to compare the most costly HCP 
scenario directly with the economic burden created by the status quo and show that even 
under what was the worst-case scenario for the board with the HCP it was still vastly 
less expensive than doing nothing (Charlotte County Interview #3 2015).  
The reserve design itself consists of approximately 3,000 acres on two large 
tracts that are already owned and managed by the county, and another 1,300 acres of 
privately owned land throughout the county that will need to be acquired through 
purchase or conservation easement. This will serve as mitigation for an estimated take of 
3,056 acres of occupied habitat from building development throughout the county 
(Charlotte County Parks & Natural Resources Division 2013). Thus the conservation set-
aside in the HCP will conserve almost 150% of the take authorized under the ITP. A 
complicating factor in making an assessment of the level of robustness of this protection 
is that the county was allowed to use land as mitigation here that it had already set aside 
for conservation under its previous HCP for capital improvement projects. Normally an 
applicant would not be allowed to count mitigation from another HCP toward the current 
one. However, FWS made an exception in this case for two reasons. First, without being 
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able to use the existing conservation lands, there would not have been enough habitat left 
in the county to complete this HCP (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013). Second, this 
conservation land was set aside for capital improvement projects that, as of completion 
of the current HCP, had not been started and thus there had been no impacts, although 
the impacts of these projects were factored into the population viability analysis for the 
current plan (Charlotte County Parks & Natural Resources Division 2013). In short, a 
decision was made that not only was this a biologically viable option, but it was the only 
biologically viable option. 
On one hand, some might legitimately view this as a weakness in this HCP, as if 
the county was allowed to get away with “double counting” its mitigation. That remains 
one caveat of assessing this as providing robust protection for the species, and thus 
interpreting this as a successful case of collaborative governance. On the other hand, this 
analysis was conducted and this alternative recommended by a professional research 
biologist who, based on the best population modeling available, determined this design 
reduced the extinction risk of the county’s remaining populations of jays more than any 
other alternative (Bowman 2011).  
It is also important to note that there are more dimensions on which to evaluate 
an HCP than just the area of the reserve design. For example, the plan requires the 
county to restore and manage both the existing conservation lands and the ones that will 
be acquired. The plan also specifies that the additional 1,300 acres will be acquired in 
areas in which the parcels can serve as “stepping stones” connecting the two larger 
conservation areas, which is important for long-term population viability because it 
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allows for increased genetic diversity within the populations. Finally, the plan also 
includes translocation of jay families from the areas in which long-term conservation is 
not viable to the reserve. The county is also required to manage the reserve in 
perpetuity—even after expiration of the initial 30-year permit—and mechanisms are in 
place to fully fund the $56 million total cost of the HCP, including land acquisition and 
creating a permanent management fund for the reserve. Under the county-wide HCP, 
owners of quarter-acre lots who want to build on them will pay a permitting fee of 
$2,200, as opposed to as much as $69,000 to create individual HCPs (Charlotte County 
Interview #2 2015, Charlotte County Parks & Natural Resources Division 2013). 
Conclusion 
With the exception of a couple of caveats, the Charlotte County HCP should be 
considered a mostly successful case of collaborative governance due to the fact that, 
according to the population modeling, it sets aside and requires management of 
sufficient reserve space to increase the long-term prospects of the species in the plan 
area. While the Charlotte County Scrub-Jay HCP is not perfect, it is unambiguously 
better than what came before it, which resulted in bad outcomes for both the species and 
landowner. Because the HCP preserves two large tracts of habitat and will obtain other 
land in order to connect them, it alleviates the development pressures on the species due 
to fragmentation, which would have only been continued under the individual HCP 
model. The HCP also will increase the baseline populations in the reserve space by 
translocating populations from the more heavily fragmented areas of the county. Without 
the HCP, the species would have likely been extirpated from Charlotte County in a 
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matter of years. With the HCP it at least has some hope of long-term survival in the 
county.  
 The outcome of the Charlotte County HCP case is consistent with what the 
theory predicted. A cooperative species created an environment of very little uncertainty 
over what needed to be done in order to conserve it. This presented no opportunities for 
opponents of robust protection for the species to use the uncertainty as a tool for 
decreases in the amount of protection. The result is that the best available science 
generated the recommended course of action for the reserve design and the development 
community and Board of Commissioners accepted it, even if reluctantly. In the next 
chapter, I will go into greater depth in comparing and contrasting the two case studies, 
and drawing conclusions regarding where these results fit the theory and where they 
suggest possible areas for refinement in the theory. 
  




The purpose of this project has been to propose and empirically evaluate a theory 
of decision-making in collaborative governance negotiations. In Chapter 2, I outlined a 
new framework for explaining outcomes in collaborative governance, drawing from 
economic theories of time-inconsistent behavior and procrastination. I incorporated into 
this framework a proposition that the level of technical complexity of the issue that is 
being negotiated can play a role in determining the outcomes, specifically with regard to 
which groups will tend to be induced to compromise. At the core of this proposition is 
the idea that a more complex subject matter, which generally will present more 
uncertainty about the outcomes of various alternative courses of action, will leave room 
in the negotiations for one savvy group to make convincing arguments for a less robust 
course of action. This will, in turn, induce the other groups to make repeated marginal 
compromises away from their ideal points throughout the process because in each round 
of negotiations they would prefer a marginal loss to the much worse outcome that 
defection might provoke.  
 To evaluate this theory I implemented two case studies of similar systems that I 
expected, based on the theory, to produce disparate outcomes. The Florida Beaches 
Habitat Conservation Plan (FBHCP) is one of the most complex multi-species, multi-
jurisdictional HCPs ever attempted in all the 33 years that HCPs have existed. By 
contrast, the Charlotte County Scrub-Jay HCP is a much simpler case because it seeks 
protection for a species whose needs are comparatively very well understood. Rich data 
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on this species’ current population and status provide scientists the ability to model 
future population viability under alternative courses of action with a degree of precision 
that frequently is not available for other species, including several of those in the 
FBHCP. I hypothesized, therefore, that the Charlotte County case would produce a more 
successful outcome from the perspective of conserving the species than would the 
FBHCP because those financially or politically interested in a less protective outcome 
would have fewer opportunities to exploit uncertainty to their advantage.  
 In this chapter I will draw detailed comparisons between these two case studies 
with a focus on assessing how well their outcomes conformed—or did not conform—to 
what the theory predicted. I will discuss what these findings mean for my theory, as well 
as broader implications for ideas of increasing popularity in both scholarship and 
practice of the collaborative governance and management of natural resources. Overall, 
the results suggest that the theory I have proposed is a useful framework for explaining 
decision-making, and ultimately outcomes, in collaborative governance. However, there 
are also key limitations to the research presented here, and future study that includes 
more cases will be necessary to identify refinements and provide more robust testing of 
the theory if it is to become a truly predictive theory of collaborative governance. Thus I 
will close this chapter with some reflections on these limitations and some possible 
future directions that this line of research might take in order to make further 
contributions to scholarship on this issue. 
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Empirical Evidence 
Data on the two case studies was gathered through a combination of interview 
and archival research methods. Meeting minutes, briefing documents, the HCP 
documents themselves, and supplemental material that came along with them were all 
analyzed were all analyzed with a focus on piecing together the stories of how these two 
HCPs originated, how negotiations over their details proceeded, and what the ultimate 
conservation policy they produced looked like. In-depth interviews were then used to fill 
in the gaps in the documents and, most importantly, to bring in the viewpoints of those 
involved in the negotiations from as many different perspectives as possible. I will 
briefly review the key findings of each case, drawing comparisons between them, before 
discussing their implications for the theory. 
The Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan 
The most important finding in the FBHCP case is that political conflict over 
whether or not the plan should go forward, and lack of support within the organization 
that will be the applicant, have stalled the HCP indefinitely. As of this writing, it is not 
clear whether this plan will ever come to fruition, however multiple sources involved in 
the process have expressed doubts. One key source of this delay has been a turnover in 
the executive branch in Florida and the subsequent change in leadership within the 
state’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). Another source is the fact that 
legislative changes have to be made in order to expand DEP’s authority to allow it to 
implement the HCP. Though all parties acknowledged as early in the process as 2009 
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that it would be best to begin reaching out to legislative staff as soon as possible to put 
these changes on the agenda, as of 2015 this process has not begun.  
The stalemate that has ensued is in large part a consequence of the fact that the 
FBHCP was developed under the radar of a number of people and organizations whose 
final approval it will ultimately need if it is going to become a reality. One interviewee 
with years of HCP experience told me that this is frequently the way these plans 
develop, but that ultimately a successful HCP is one that, even if it is developed under 
the radar, has a good chance of being approved by whatever body needs to approve it. If 
that cannot be done, it is not a successful HCP because it becomes a waste of time and 
resources, with no benefit for the species or the regulated community (Charlotte County 
Interview #1 2013).  
On the other hand, from the perspective of all who would like to see an HCP like 
this one become a reality, there is good reason to want to keep it under the radar, 
especially in the early stages. The was evident in the FBHCP. Countless examples from 
the meeting minutes show that the members of the steering committee were clearly 
aware of what the perceptions of the public or legislators could be, and how they could 
have detrimental effects on the prospects for the HCP being completed and authorized. 
This showed up in discussions of draft chapters of the HCP, in planning for briefings 
with DEP leadership and legislative staff, and in preparing a primer document to begin 
selectively disseminating information about the HCP to the public. This also became 
evident in conversation with one particularly candid interviewee who went on at length 
about all the groups that could ultimately end up having a problem with the HCP that 
  106 
could likely stop it from becoming policy (FBHCP Interview #8 2014). If word got out 
to the public that DEP was developing a large, costly new regulatory program alarm 
bells in all sorts of offices throughout Tallahassee could begin sounding. It is not 
surprising that those crafting such a large and impactful policy as the FBHCP would be 
leery of releasing too much information too early in much the same way that those 
writing healthcare legislation might be, lest somebody decide to announce there are 
going to be death panels.  
The need for the public and its elected representatives to be looking the other 
way while something like this is developed, however, is an interesting juxtaposition 
against the classic image of a collaborative governance undertaking, among the virtues 
of which are supposed to be transparency, deliberativeness, and representation. It speaks 
to the possible mismatch of the collaborative method with policy efforts as large as this 
one and entangled in so many disparate interests. The result, at least in the FBHCP case, 
is the presence of additional transaction costs that incentivize delaying action. From the 
perspective of DEP, the incentive to delay is clear. It can push forward with the HCP, 
which comes with the potentially heavy cost of incurring the wrath of powerful political 
allies of the Governor, or it can simply delay, perhaps hoping for better prospects under 
the next Governor. Meanwhile, the delay produces the worst possible outcome for the 
species.  
From the perspective of the Fish & Wildlife Service and the environmental 
groups, presumably one of them could put a foot down and induce some sort of action on 
the part of DEP, but it is not clear that the incentives are in place for them to do this. 
  107 
FWS is a beleaguered federal agency that is consistently being called to task for standing 
in the way of economic development. Its abilities to perform its endangered species 
functions have been curtailed by successive budget cuts over the past several years 
(Center for Biological Diversity 2014, Defenders of Wildlife 2012). It constantly has to 
be mindful of potential political backlash for its actions. Though it has the authority to 
do so, it rarely takes action against states or local governments for violations of the 
Endangered Species Act’s Section 9 prohibition on take, relying instead on 
environmental interest groups to carry the burden through litigation (Charlotte County 
Interview #1 2013). The environmental groups could sue to induce DEP into action. 
However, they have invested years in the collaborative process, and would much rather 
see it succeed. Lawsuits are also extremely costly, and it is not clear in this scenario that 
this would induce an outcome that is appreciably better than continuing to wait and see 
what will happen next. Thus at each stage in which further delay is proposed, the 
incentives of the environmental groups are to continue holding hope that things will 
move forward again. Of course, this interpretation is in part speculative, as it remains to 
be seen how the FBHCP negotiation process will end, and if it will ever produce a 
complete plan. However, it is very unlikely to happen under the current conditions. 
The Charlotte County Scrub-Jay Habitat Conservation Plan 
By contrast, the Charlotte County HCP, at least once it was finally authorized by 
the county Board of Commissioners, has not suffered from the same perverse incentives 
that we see in the FBHCP. It bears discussion, however, that in the much broader picture 
the Charlotte County case is also an example of a similar sort of delay and 
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procrastination to what has occurred in the FBHCP. It was 13 years from the time the 
Fish & Wildlife Service first sent a letter to the county notifying it that it was responsible 
for take of Scrub-Jay habitat to the time the Board of Commissioners entered into 
agreement to prepare its first HCP, which ended up excluding residential development. It 
took another three years after to convince the Board to direct county staff to begin 
preparing a second HCP that included residential development (Charlotte County Parks 
& Natural Resources Division 2013). In that time the habitat continued to be fragmented 
and degraded by development (Charlotte County Interview #3 2015). Why the county 
chose to delay is fairly clear. They were hoping the birds would die and the problem 
would solve itself before they would be forced to act (Charlotte County Interview #1 
2013). Why FWS waited so long to take action is less clear. One possibility is that, as 
mentioned before, FWS is wary of political backlash, and as a result it prefers the carrot 
to the stick in terms of the tools it uses to bring counties into compliance. Also as I 
mentioned before, fur much of this time relations between the agency and the county 
were strained. In fact, they were so bad that that at one point a member of the county 
Board of Commissioners allegedly threatened the FWS field supervisor with physical 
violence (Charlotte County Interview #1 2013).  
 This is all to show that the Charlotte County case was no less politically 
contentious than the FBHCP. In fact, the political fight over the Charlotte County HCP 
was probably more intense because did not have the benefit of flying under the radar for 
so long. Once FWS stopped delaying the political fight and convinced the county that an 
HCP was its best bet for getting the agency out of its way, they were able to work 
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together toward a solution that satisfied everybody’s needs while also conserving the 
resource.  
 So, in spite of the fact that the Charlotte County HCP was equally as politically 
contentious as the FBHCP, why was it, at least to this point, more successful? Why were 
the powerful interests involved, who would have preferred to continue playing for more 
time until the last of the Scrub-Jays died, unable to do this? Why were they unable to 
minimize the reserve design to lower the $56 million price tag for their mitigation?  
Admittedly, a part of this answer probably has something to do with the unique 
properties of the Scrub-Jay itself. Waiting for it to die was going to take longer than 
these people had assumed. Scrub-Jays will continue to live, and even breed for some 
time in degraded habitat. They will eventually die off after a few generations, but with 
each individual jay living up to 15.5 years, it could literally be decades before the 
problem “solved itself,” from the county’s perspective.  
However, the rest of the answer to explaining the differences in outcomes 
between Charlotte County and the FBHCP is in the technical complexity, or lack thereof. 
While the FBHCP fell victim mostly to political gridlock, this was itself a side effect of 
taking on a project of such massive scope geographically and scientifically. The 
uncertainty that the additional species presented, particularly the shorebirds, made the 
political problems larger because it increased the size and scope of this new regulatory 
program. This exacerbated the political uncertainty and resulted in the current state of 
affairs. Charlotte County, because of the nature of the species at the center of the fight, 
did not have these problems, in spite of having its share of political conflict.  
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With very reliable data about the species’ status and needs for conservation on 
their side, the environmental interests and scientific community in the Charlotte County 
case were able to construct precise models showing how much reserve space and what 
type of design was necessary in order to improve the long-term prognosis the species in 
the county. They also had the advantage of understanding the technical subject matter 
better than the members of the board or the development interests, so once they 
established a level of trust there was very little questioning of the science, and they were 
left to let the science dictate the plan.  
The relative simplicity of the case also created less political uncertainty than 
what the FBHCP experienced. Though they were politically powerful interests, the 
Charlotte County case had relatively few interests involved, and thus fewer 
constituencies to please and fewer players to create political turmoil in the negotiation 
process. By organizing these interests up front, including the legislative body ultimately 
responsible for authorizing the implementation of the HCP, the organizers of the 
Charlotte County case were able to avoid the same problems that have stalled the 
FBHCP.  
Implications for the Theory 
Overall, these results are consistent with what was hypothesized and thus they 
suggest support for the basic framework that was constructed in Chapter 2. However, at 
the risk of being accused of overstating the case, it should be noted that everything did 
not turn out exactly as hypothesized. These weaknesses highlight some areas in which 
the theory might be refined and re-evaluated in the future. Probably the largest of these 
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limitations is the non-outcome observed in the FBHCP case. While the theory is not 
necessarily inconsistent with this outcome, as I have argued above and in Chapter 4, it 
would not have necessarily predicted this outcome either. Further refinements might be 
made to explain and predict such a stalemate that has been observed in this case.  
 What the original theory would have predicted for this case would be an outcome 
that is a completed HCP, but one that would be at or close to the bare minimum that the 
Fish & Wildlife Service could consider statutorily complete. The theory predicted that a 
focus on the uncertainty and complexity of taking the more protective path would have 
induced the environmental groups to make marginal compromises throughout the 
process, ultimately leading to an outcome that they might not have been willing to accept 
in the beginning. Instead, what we see is that the complexity of the case has produced an 
outcome that is, perhaps biologically similar, but that differs from what was expected in 
some important ways.  
 One problem with this, of course, is that the non-outcome means that the 
predicted outcome is unobservable at this point, preventing any direct comparisons 
between the two cases on specific outcomes. However, the outcome of the FBHCP also 
differs from what was expected in that the environmental groups were not moved toward 
accepting a less protective form of mitigation, but rather they were moved from their 
temporal preferences for completing the process as quickly as possible to put the 
mitigation measures in place before the habitat could be further degraded. One way in 
which this kind of outcome might be predicted with theoretical refinements in the future 
is through incorporating transaction costs that increase directly proportional to the 
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number of affected interests that are entangled in the policy. The theory in its current 
statement predicts increased likelihood of an unsuccessful outcome in a highly 
technically complex case such as the FBHCP, and a successful outcome in a less 
complicated case such as Charlotte County. However, it might be appropriate to 
differentiate between the two possible types of unsuccessful outcome, the one that is 
unsuccessful from a substantive perspective and the non-outcome. The FBHCP is clearly 
a case of the latter type of unsuccessful outcome.  
One possible critique of this interpretation of the findings is that it is neither 
surprising nor theoretically interesting to show that technical complexity causes delay. I 
would argue instead that the case has shown that technical complexity increases 
decision-making costs through increased uncertainty about the consequences of 
decisions. The hypothesis as originally stated was that this uncertainty would lead to the 
acceptance of an incrementally less protective conservation plan. Instead, however, the 
results in this case reveal that the uncertainty created incentives for all those involved to 
accept incrementally further delay each time it was offered as a temporary solution. 
Instead of accepting, for example, an incrementally smaller amount of preserve space for 
the species, FWS and the environmental groups accepted incrementally longer delay. 
This is equally as unsuccessful an outcome from the perspective of conserving the 
species, or worse, than shrinking the preserve space. It might be fair to say that this is a 
case in the power to force non-decisions was equally as consequential as exerting 
influence over decisions (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). However, this does not mitigate 
the actual decisions of FWS and the environmental interests to be drawn incrementally 
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further away from a successful outcome throughout the negotiation process, in spite of 
the fact that all have tools at their disposal to induce a different outcome. 
This might lead to questions regarding how success is defined in these cases for 
the purpose of this analysis. There are multiple ways in which success could be defined 
in an HCP. For many scholars of collaboration, as well as the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
success is at least in part defined by the occurrence of collaboration or compromise 
itself. This is the definition that I explicitly avoid here for reasons that I have elaborated 
in the first two chapters, but most importantly because it tells us nothing about the 
substantive impact of collaboration on conservation of the resource. However, even from 
a substantive standpoint there are different ways to understand success from different 
perspectives. For example, success as defined by the informal yet often-stated objectives 
of the HCP program is a streamlining of the development permitting process. It is an 
outcome that allows development to continue relatively unaffected by the presence of 
species, but with some assurances that harms to species will be minimized and mitigated. 
However, this yardstick only allows us to measure how good collaboration is for 
development, but not for the species impacted by development. If the goal is to prevent 
species extinctions and biodiversity loss related to human activities, as is the explicitly 
stated goal of the ESA, then we need a yardstick that tells us what the outcome looks 
like from the species perspective. This is a more difficult thing to measure because we 
do not have the advantage of the kind of time we would need to look at results of 
longitudinal population studies to determine if an HCP has truly achieved its goal of 
stabilizing the population. So we are left to assess this through proxies, such as how 
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much preserve space was set aside, how contiguous it is, how aggressive the adaptive 
management plan is, and how ambitious, overall, the HCP is. Ultimately, I have assessed 
the Charlotte County case as a success because the plan that ultimately emerged and is 
currently being implemented in that case is the one that the scientific modeling showed 
gave the Scrub-Jay the best possible chances for survival of any alternative that was 
practicable. 
However, examining outcomes as a dependent variable rather than process alone 
does not hinge only upon calling one case a success and the other one a failure. We can 
also look at the ideal points of the various players and the movement on them. In the 
Charlotte County case, it was the development and pro-development political interests 
that were forced to move from their ideal points, which were essentially to continue 
doing nothing about the Scrub-Jay until it was eventually extirpated from the county and 
there would be no more conflict. However, due to the relatively low level of technical 
complexity in this case it was easy for the scientific experts and the pro-conservation 
interests to demonstrate that this option would not work because it would require a 
longer delay than could be sustained. Essentially, the conservation interests played the 
“savvy” role here while the development interests allowed them mostly to dictate the 
terms.  
By contrast, the political complexity in the FBHCP case allowed the process to 
be halted indefinitely by the interests that benefit from that outcome. In this case, it is 
helpful to think about ideal points not only spatially, but also temporally. The longer the 
delay, the more difficult it will be to complete the HCP. Property values on the land that 
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will need to be acquired will continue to increase as real estate prices rise and suitable 
land becomes scarcer. The Sea Turtle Conservancy, in particular, has been explicit in the 
meeting minutes about the fact that its ideal point is to complete the HCP and get it into 
implementation as quickly and expediently as possible. Obviously the group has moved 
far from that ideal point by continuing to accept delay. Meanwhile, there is no evidence 
that development interests have given up anything in the negotiations. These interests 
benefit from the delay, at least over the near-to-medium term. Whether this is in their 
best interest over the longer-term is not as obvious.  
It might be necessary here also to clarify the roles of the two types of complexity 
that are having effects here, and also how they interplay with one another. The two types 
of complexity at play here are technical and political. These two types of complexity are 
not unrelated. Specifically, the results suggest that the technical complexity is a 
contributing factor exacerbating the political complexity. I will give an example.  The 
FBHCP was originally conceived to address losses of sea turtle nesting habitat, with 
relatively strong support from DEP, albeit reluctant. As the realization set in among the 
members of the steering committee that they were going to have to incorporate several 
additional species, which added complexity and expense, several members of the 
steering committee, including the Sea Turtle Conservancy, began to express concerns 
not only about the additional time required to obtain the necessary data to guide the 
decisions, but also about the potential political pitfalls of expanding the scope of the 
HCP beyond that which was originally intended. Members expressed concerns about the 
potential backlash of doing anything that would be perceived as larger or beyond what 
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was minimally necessary. The more people think the HCP is going above and beyond 
the minimum, the more apt they are to be convinced it as a large new regulatory program 
or a land grab. Also, the more species are include, the more conservation land must be 
acquired, and in different places. All of this means more interests potentially affected. It 
was when these issues cropped up that divisions began to appear between the members 
of the steering committee. Many openly worried that anything more than the minimum 
absolutely necessary would be especially difficult to sell to legislators. This is how 
technical and political complexity worked together in the FBHCP case to make delay the 
most attractive option, even for the parties that do not benefit from it.   
However, there is also the individual effect of political uncertainty itself to 
consider. The results suggest a status quo bias of political uncertainty. The other source 
of political complexity here is the electoral turnover, which is independent of the 
technical complexity. While the technical complexity makes the HCP tougher to sell to 
the public and elected officials, the electoral turmoil makes it even more difficult, and 
increases the uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of any course of action. When Rick 
Scott was elected Governor in 2010, the members of the steering committee did not 
know what to expect. What they knew was that he had run on an anti-regulation platform 
and filled key cabinet positions with industry standard-bearers. There was a great deal of 
uncertainty and apprehension surrounding what would happen when the new governor’s 
people were finally briefed on the HCP project. They still are uncertain what to expect. 
In interviews, members of the steering committee expressed concerns to me that DEP 
might still act on its own to weaken the HCP before submitting it to FWS. Considering 
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FWS is a relatively weak actor as discussed above, it would be able to do little about this 
as long as it is technically statutorily complete. It is fair to say is that the environmental 
groups are quite certain that this is what would happen if they chose to exit the 
negotiations. In that event, they would have to try their luck in the courts in hope of 
getting something better, which is expensive and far from a guarantee. We can see then 
how this creates a bias toward going along with the delay in the hope that something will 
change, or that they will be able to convince everyone that a robust HCP is good for 
them. The effect of this then is to favor inaction and perpetuation of the status quo. 
Broader Implications for Collaborative Governance 
In addition to evaluating the theory proposed in this project, the results carry 
lessons for the broader theory and practice of collaborative governance. Perhaps the 
most important implication to be drawn from this is that of scale. The contrast in 
outcomes between the Florida Beaches and Charlotte County HCPs might be an 
interesting cautionary tale in expanding the scope of collaborative governance beyond 
that for which it is ideally suited. This presents an interesting quandary with regard to 
finding the ideal scale on which to address problems, especially environmental and 
natural resources ones.  
 With environmental problems, the best science of the day tells us that the most 
effective way to address them is at the ecosystem scale (e.g., Layzer 2008). Even the 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, in its Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook, 
encourages the inclusion of multiple species in large, cooperative HCPs (U.S. 
Department of the Interior 1996). With habitat fragmentation as a major threat to many 
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species, the science tells us that bigger is better. However, the empirical evidence from 
the two cases analyzed here suggests that from a political standpoint, too big might not 
work at all. Both of these cases serve as illustrative examples of this phenomenon. The 
FBHCP appears poised to collapse under its own weight because its organizers have 
realized that, once they put a proposed plan in front of legislators and the public to be 
scrutinized, there will be too many opportunities for too many interested parties to find a 
reason not to like it. With the Charlotte County HCP, while we saw that they created a 
plan that was likely the most ecologically sound one they could given what was left in 
the county to work with, we also saw that, had they been able to partner with 
neighboring Sarasota County they might have been able to do even better. However, that 
just was not possible because they could not force Sarasota County to engage in a 
parallel effort.  
 This lesson regarding scale applies not only to the theory, but also to the practice 
of collaborative governance. It could also be important beyond efforts to conserve 
endangered species, and even beyond environmental and natural resources problems. 
There are, indeed, all manner of problems that inconveniently fail to heed arbitrary 
political boundaries. Just as a few examples we might think of areas such as 
immigration, transportation, criminal justice, and even education to some extent, as 
potentially having issues that spill across multiple political boundaries and affect varied 
and competing interests. The federal criminal background check system for the 
purchasing of firearms is a timely and tragic example. The system, which relies on 
cooperation from fifty state and thousands of local governments has been long known to 
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be in disarray due to poor cooperation of many of these state and local governments with 
reporting guidelines (Ferris 2014). The issue is, of course, rife with powerful political 
interests that sound public alarm bells whenever any changes are proposed. 
 On the other hand, it is perhaps not terribly surprising that there might be a 
threshold beyond which collaborative governance is an ill suited instrument for making 
public decisions. After all, it is not clear that it was ever intended to work beyond very 
small-scale negotiations between handfuls of individuals who know each other well, to 
solve very local level collective action dilemmas.  
 Another point that bears discussion is the implications of these findings for the 
role of leadership in collaborative governance. There are two levels of leadership at play 
here: the political level and what I will call the administrative level. By administrative 
level I mean the people on the ground facilitating the negotiations, participating in them, 
and moving them forward. At this level it is fair to say that leadership was basically a 
constant in these cases. Both cases had relatively savvy leaders who understood well 
both the technical and political complexities with which they were dealing. In fact, there 
was even some degree of overlap in the actual individuals involved at this level, 
particularly within the FWS.  
 However, at the political level, there is stark contrast between the leadership in 
both cases. In the Charlotte County case, there was strong political support at the top 
(post-electoral turnover and repaired relations with FWS). By contrast, nearly the 
opposite happened in the FBHCP case, wherein electoral turnover resulted in a decrease 
in support at the top of the organizational chart. However, I do not view this as a 
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challenge to the theory because the electoral turnover and accompanying fluctuations in 
leadership are merely additional sources of political complexity that generate political 
uncertainty.  
 However, another way to think about leadership is that one of the problems here 
is a lack of strong leadership overall. In theory, there is a threat of a “leviathan” showing 
up and imposing a solution on the actors in the FBHCP case. And perhaps if this were 
the case there would be some incentive to avoid the delay that has been observed. 
Practically, however, this seems unlikely because the FWS and other pro-conservation 
interests are in relatively weak positions to act in this role. We do not see strong 
leadership entering and taking control for precisely the reasons that were hypothesized 
from the beginning. The technical circumstances, combined with the norms of 
cooperative spirit, keep these players in relatively weak positions in which they are 
averse to rocking the boat for fear of inducing a bad outcome if they do. 
 This raises the question, how could such an outcome be avoided in the future? 
How can the perverse effects of technical and political uncertainty demonstrated here be 
avoided? To address that, one would have to address the fact that nearly everything 
about the political structure of the FBHCP and the HCP program is pushing it in the 
direction of inaction. First, economic imperatives push the political principals involved 
toward the most politically expedient outcome, which is the cheapest, least intrusive one. 
The uncertainty about political backlash makes FWS a weak negotiator, even though in 
theory it is supposed to be the strong federal agency that has formal veto power. The 
likelihood of relieving state and local officials of those economic imperatives is 
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essentially zero. Also, barring some major and equally unlikely shift to the left in both 
Congress and the White House, FWS is only going to become weaker still.  
 Therefore, to change this outcome, what would likely need to happen is for some 
procedure to be institutionalized that would privilege conservation in any event that 
there is reasonable doubt about the impacts of an action. This precautionary principle has 
already been used elsewhere in environmental management. It could be incorporated 
into the habitat conservation planning guidelines. Then, in cases where technical 
complexity creates ambiguity over the correct path to protect the species, no negotiations 
would be necessary. The rules would force the actors to choose the more protective 
alternative. Of course, this might only go so far to help produce better outcomes because 
there would still likely be plenty of ambiguity over how much uncertainty there must be 
to invoke this failsafe. It would also likely make large-scale HCPs a less attractive tool 
for development interests. Currently their major selling point, as demonstrated in the 
Charlotte County HCP, is that they make mitigation cheaper and simpler, like buying in 
bulk versus buying one-at-a-time. If this method were to make them more expensive 
with stricter requirements—and it likely would—it might be more difficult to convince 
developers that it is worthwhile. 
 Another option might be to borrow from European-style corporatist negotiations, 
which produce a binding agreement. In these negotiations, suing later because one does 
not like the outcome is not an option, so parties have to get everything they want up 
front. This type of credible commitment to seeing through negotiations and abiding by 
the outcome could de-incentivize procrastination by disabusing the environmental 
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groups of the delusion that they will defect and sue at some point in the future if things 
continue to go poorly for them. All parties would have to make credible commitments up 
front to producing something that everyone can live with. Though again, this would 
make the larger-scale HCPs less attractive.  
 The best option is probably to attempt to replicate in other cases what happened 
in Charlotte County’s second attempt at an HCP. There political uncertainty was 
alleviated for the county commissioners. When the realtors and builders were convinced 
to come along, they convinced the board that, not only would there be no political 
backlash if they went along with the HCP, but that it was in fact in line with their 
economic imperative because it would get FWS and the environmental groups off their 
backs. At the same time, this again bumps up against the idea that perhaps, even though 
the science tells us larger, ecosystem scale planning is better, it might not be practicable 
in some cases because the number of interests that would need to be successfully 
brought on board is simply too high.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Of course, the lessons drawn from these cases should be taken with a few 
caveats. In addition to those already discussed above, probably the most important 
caveat to consider when interpreting these cases is the limited-n research design. 
Although these cases were selected with a focus on creating the most effective limited-n 
research design possible, there are still, of course, weaknesses to this research design. 
First is the problem of generalizability. Would similar results have been found had the 
subject of the empirical work been habitat conservation planning in some other state 
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instead of Florida? Could these results be generalized beyond the case of habitat 
conservation planning, perhaps even to a policy area outside of environmental policy 
altogether?  
 To answer these questions will require further research in the future. Specifically, 
it will require the subject matter to be broadened beyond habitat conservation planning 
in Florida. The results from this initial study are promising and they indicate that this 
theory warrants further testing and evaluation. Certainly the increasing popularity of the 
collaborative approach to managing natural resources in the U.S., and around the world, 
creates a practical demand for building a better understanding of how collaboration 
works and moving toward predictive theories of collaborative governance. Continuing to 
study these phenomena in different settings will not only provide further testing of the 
theory, but it will also continue to suggest further refinements that can be incorporated to 
make it truly predictive.  
 However, another reasonable critique could be raised regarding the drawbacks of 
limited-n research. It is difficult with these two cases to flesh out whether the observed 
results were caused by technical complexity or scale. Admittedly, this is a drawback to 
this project. The source of the problem is that complexity and scale are highly correlated. 
The FBHCP serves as an example of why this is the case. In the FBHCP, one of the 
major sources of technical complexity is its scale, both geographically and in its broad 
inclusion of so many species. This is an issue that should be addressed in future research 
if appropriate cases can be identified and studied. One possibility would be to find a case 
of an HCP for a single species in a smaller geographical area, such as a single county, 
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but in which the nature of the species itself or the particular threat to the species brings a 
high level of technical complexity and scientific uncertainty into the picture.  
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